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Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite prominently set forth responsive
regulation as an important regulatory theory.' According to this the-
ory, regulators should be responsive to regulated parties and to partic-
ular contexts to develop innovative regulatory techniques in different
situations. Responsive regulation offers regulatory tools and ap-
proaches designed to move beyond a one-size-fits all framework and,
ideally, gain voluntary compliance by regulated parties.2
Scholars have produced a large body of work on the application of
responsive regulation to tax administration, or "responsive tax admin-
istration." By and large, this work has supported responsive tax ad-
ministration as "a viable alternative for organizing the administration
of the tax system."' 3 Responsive tax administration theory has influ-
enced compliance scholars in the United States and related tax com-
pliance research. For example, Dennis Ventry, Leslie Book, Sagit
Leviner, and Rachelle Holmes have advocated explicitly for adoption
of responsive tax administration in the United States.4 Numerous
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I The seminal work is Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992).
For further discussion of responsive regulation, see text accompanying notes 24-60.
2 For example, Ayres and Braithwaite in their founding work expound on the benign big
gun, tripartism, enforced self-regulation, partial-industry intervention, and delegation and
participation. Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1.
3 Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 Law &
Pol'y 3, 4 (2007).
4 Leslie Book, Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap, 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 85,
113 n.166 (2009) (citing the Compliance Assurance Process as a positive example of the
government creating a "dynamic of compliance" within the responsive tax administration
framework); Rachelle Holmes, Forcing Cooperation: A Strategy for Improving Tax Com-
pliance, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1415, 1419-21, 1435-41 (2011); Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax
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other tax scholars have supported programs, such as the Compliance
Assurance Process (CAP), that fall within a responsive tax administra-
tion framework,5 and have used responsive tax administration as a
model for policy analysis. 6
The IRS has engaged in a revolutionary renovation of large busi-
ness tax administration in a manner that, in many ways, is consistent
with responsive tax administration theory.7 Fundamentally, the IRS
has shifted toward cooperative tax regulation with large business tax-
payers. While the Service, in some respects, has long worked with
large business taxpayers as part of its compliance enterprise, these col-
laborations were limited and did not challenge the inherently adver-
sarial relationship between the IRS and taxpayers.8 The new, self-
Enforcement: From "Big Stick" to Responsive Regulation, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 381,
385-86, 419-24 (2009); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 Conn. L. Rev.
431, 438, 465-66 (2008).
5 See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax
Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 961, 1012-13 (2006) (describing CAP as a
regulatory model that "deserves continued support"); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing
Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 689, 738
(2009) (discussing CAP as an example of one of the rewards for nongamers that the Ser-
vice could use in his proposed dual enforcement regime); Bret Wells, Voluntary Compli-
ance: "This Return Might Be Correct But Probably Isn't," 29 Va. Tax. Rev. 645, 679-80
(2010) (examining CAP as a way "to resolve potential uncertainties in a proactive and
transparent manner [which is a] desirable policy outcome"); Lisa De Simone, Richard C.
Sansing & Jeri K. Seidman, When Are Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs
Mutually Beneficial? (McCombs Research Paper Series No. ACC-07-11, 2011) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954823; see also Paul J. Beck & Petro Lisowsky, Financial State-
ment Incentives and Benefits of Voluntary Real-Time Tax Audits 36 (2011 Am. Tax'n
Ass'n Midyear Meeting: Research-in-Process, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1761343 (suggesting "that the CAP program has the potential
to generate tangible financial reporting benefits that might be of interest to financial regu-
lators like the Securities and Exchange Commission"). For the rooting of CAP within the
responsive tax administration framework, see, e.g., Ventry, note 4, at 465 n.196.
6 See, e.g., Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 387, 427-30 (2011)
(discussing responsive tax administration's ability to increase compliance through micro-
compliance spirals).
7 See, e.g., Ventry, note 4, at 438, 465-66 (arguing that, as part of a responsive regulation
program, the IRS "could involve taxpayers and their advisors more directly in regulatory
processes," for example through the "pre-filing initiatives, including the Advance Pricing
Agreement (APA) Program, the Industry Issue Resolution program, the Pre-Filing Agree-
ment program, and the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP)" as well as through the
"streamlined dispute resolution process" offered by the Fast Track Settlement program);
see also John Braithwaite, Large Business and the Compliance Model, in Taxing Democ-
racy 177, 194 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003) [hereinafter Taxing Democracy] (discussing,
as examples of the Australian Taxation Office's (ATO) adherence to the responsive regula-
tion framework, a movement "from full audit as a more or less standard single compliance
product to a suite of audit products: roll-over audits, pre-lodgment audits, last year lodged
audits, specific issue audits, loss tracking audits, new legislation/ruling reviews and record
retention audits").
8 See Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Ad-
vance Tax Rulings, 29 Va. Tax Rev. 137, 141, 149-50, 154-69 (2009) (describing existing
advance ruling processes and explaining their limited use within an adversarial system); see
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declared, IRS "revolution" 9 in large business tax administration is
characterized by a more extensive shift in mentality, away from this
adversarial approach and toward cooperative compliance partner-
ships. A number of innovative programs are part of the revolution. 10
The most significant and transformative is CAP, which began as a pi-
lot program for large business taxpayers in 2005. CAP is a real-time
compliance review process, whereby large business taxpayers work
with the IRS to resolve all tax positions prior to tax return filing.1
The list of CAP users is becoming a veritable who's who of major
corporations. Companies such as General Motors, 12 Pfizer, 13
Wendy's, 14 Prudential, 5 Estee Lauder, 16 J.C. Penny,17 and Intel' 8
have participated in CAP. Their participation represents a major shift
in large business tax administration, from an adversarial, post-filing
audit system to a collaborative prefiling conversation.' 9 Buoyed by
this vision, and citing CAP's "popularity," the IRS recently finalized
also David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 Tax L. Rev. 331, 335 (2006) (describing
both the practice in which large corporations provide auditors on-site space for their audit-
ing duties and how this situation could be manipulated to ensure "a successful audit [from
the taxpayer's perspective]").
9 Donald L. Korb, Korb Discusses "Coming Revolution" in Large Corporate Exams
(Jan. 24, 2006), 2006 TNT 16-23, Jan. 25, 2006, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (state-
ment of Donald L. Korb, Chief Counsel, IRS) (citing CAP as part of the "coming revolu-
tion in examination of large corporate taxpayers"); Dustin Stamper, Everson Credits
Enforcement for New Revenues, Pledges More Reporting Proposals (Oct. 24, 2006), 2006
TNT 205-1, Oct. 24, 2006, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (reporting that IRS Com-
missioner Mark Everson expects new methods to "revolutionize tax administration").
10 These programs include, most notably: CAP, APAs (which are, to some extent, carry-
overs from the old regime), Pre-Filing Agreements, Fast Track Settlement, Limited Issue
Focus Examinations, and Industry Issue Resolution. IRS, Large & Midsize Bus. Subgroup
Report (2008 IRSAC Report), available at http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/Large-&-
Midsize-Business-Subgroup-Report-(2008-IRSAC-Report).
11 IRM 4.51.8.
12 Gen. Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 240 (Apr. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov./Archives/edgar/data/1467858/000119312510078119/dlOk.htm.
13 Pfizer Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-Q), at 60 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.
sec.gov./Archives/edgar/data/78003/000115752309007794/a6090863.htm.
14 Wendy's/Arby's Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 58, 104 (Mar. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov./Archives/edgar/data/30697/000003069711000019/formlO-k-
01022011.htm.
15 Prudential Fin., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 91, 325 (Feb. 27, 2009), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1137774/000119312509039316/dlOk.htm.
16 Estee Lauder, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-23 (Aug. 22, 2011), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1001250/000110465911048120/all-17991_llOk.htm.
17 Jeremiah Coder, Corporate Taxpayers Face Challenges Under New IRS Reporting
Regimes (Feb. 17, 2011), 2011 TNT 33-1, Feb. 21, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File.
18 Id. Many other prominent companies including, in particular, technology companies,
have indicated informally their participation in CAP without formally indicating their par-
ticipation in CAP in SEC filings or otherwise.
19 Tax Fairness: Policy and Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Kathy Petronchak, Comm'r Small Bus./Self Em-
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and expanded CAP. 20 In so doing, IRS Commissioner Douglas Shul-
man called CAP "a program where the tax system is at its best. '21 He
suggested that CAP's finalization would solidify its importance in
large business tax administration. 22 The finalization greatly expanded
CAP from a program available to only the very largest business tax-
payers to one available across the entire large business tax base, which
includes approximately 250,000 taxpayers. 23
Little noticed amidst all the fanfare in support of CAP are the po-
tential problems that lie beneath the surface. This vacuum is emblem-
atic of the broader failure to analyze critically the limitations of
responsive tax administration for U.S. tax compliance. This Article
contributes to the literature by highlighting this void and beginning to
fill it. The Article examines problems with responsive tax administra-
tion theory, as well as difficulties with its implementation in the U.S.
large business sector. At the theoretical level, responsive tax adminis-
tration has been treated as increasingly compelling, in the absence of
empirical evidence sufficient to support this account. While lack of
strong empirical evidence plagues much tax compliance work, the em-
pirical ambiguity in the case of responsive tax administration nonethe-
less counsels in favor of a more critical analysis. At the
implementation level, responsive tax administration programs in the
U.S. large business sector have over-emphasized the theory's persua-
sive aspects, threatening to undermine important deterrence measures
(including both the threat of punishment and the threat of random
audit).
The Article reaches these conclusions through the case study of
CAP, which is a lens into both the theoretical and implementation
difficulties. The Article sets forth three central problems with CAP:
reduced accountability at the very time that increased accountability is
needed, lack of meaningful penalties for failure-to-disclose violations
and a resulting "test-drive effect," and a self-selection bias problem.
The first problem flows from the potential weaknesses of responsive
tax administration theory and the latter two flow from the overem-
phasis on persuasion in its implementation in the United States.
ployed Div. of the IRS), reprinted in 2007 TNT 44-27, Mar. 5, 2007, available in LEXIS,
Tax Analysts File.
20 Press Release, IRS, IRS Expands and Makes Permanent Its Compliance Assurance




22 Shulman Says IRS Appeals Personnel Will No Longer Sit on Issue Management
Teams, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 5, 2011, at G-3.
23 Shamik Trivedi & Amy S. Elliott, LB&I Expands, Makes Permanent CAP Real-Time
Audit Program, 131 Tax Notes 10 (Apr. 4, 2011).
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The first problem with CAP is that the IRS has linked the rise of
CAP with reduced monitoring and accountability for large business
tax administration when, in fact, the exact opposite is appropriate.
The IRS' faith in CAP to yield compliance is consistent with a mea-
sure of academic faith in responsive tax administration more gener-
ally. This Article demonstrates that the empirical evidence for
responsive tax administration remains complicated and ambiguous,
counseling in favor of more caution and less faith in both responsive
tax administration and CAP.
The second problem with CAP is that it lacks meaningful penalties
for failure-to-disclose violations, which contravenes responsive regula-
tion's own advisement to back up persuasive efforts with a big stick.
As a result, CAP lacks an important means to ensure the transparency
on which the program is premised. Even more troublesome, CAP cre-
ates a test-drive effect, whereby taxpayers are able to see how their
IRS review fares, prior to being subject to the failure-to-disclose pen-
alties that apply in the return filing context. The result may be an
unfortunate weakening of the important tax disclosure system.
The third problem with CAP is that its expansion beyond the largest
taxpayers presents potential self-selection bias problems. While offer-
ing CAP to taxpayers that otherwise would undergo a traditional audit
may make sense, offering it in a broad-based fashion to taxpayers that
otherwise would not be subject to audit may improperly allocate IRS
resources. A strain of thought in the tax compliance literature,
dovetailing with responsive tax administration theory, suggests that
providing service can encourage compliance. Offering CAP by open
invitation to all large business taxpayers, however, inappropriately
overlooks important research regarding the power of random audit to
compel indirect compliance. This is particularly important in a world
of scarce resources, in which the IRS simply cannot provide the full
responsive tax administration pyramid of persuasion, backed by puni-
tive measures, to all large business taxpayers. Providing service across
the entire large business tax base thus overemphasizes persuasion, to
the detriment of deterrence.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II sketches the rise of respon-
sive tax administration, related theories, and CAP, along with claimed
benefits of CAP and the limitations of these benefits. Part III exam-
ines the problem of reduced accountability as a result of faith in re-
sponsive tax administration and CAP. Part IV discusses the lack of
meaningful penalties in CAP and the resulting test-drive effect. Part
V sets forth the self-selection bias problem. Part VI briefly suggests
solutions to each of these problems and explains how the CAP analy-
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
TAX LAW REVIEW
sis points to a broader need for more realism about responsive tax
administration in U.S. large business administration.
II. RISE OF RESPONSIVE TAx ADMINISTRATION AND CAP
Analyzing the influence of responsive tax administration on the
U.S. large business sector through CAP requires a basic understand-
ing of the tenets of responsive tax administration, the related lines of
tax compliance research, and the development of CAP. Part II pro-
vides this framework and also highlights arguments made in favor of
CAP and the limitations of these arguments.
A. Responsive Tax Administration
Responsive regulation is a strain of thought within a broader, post-
New Deal vision of the regulatory state known as "new governance."
New governance is a "loosely related family" 24 of governance ap-
proaches which, most fundamentally, shift away from a regulatory
model known as command-and-control. The command-and-control
model, which dominated in the New Deal era and the 1970's, was "hi-
erarchical, state-centric, bureaucratic, top-down and expert-driven. ' 25
In contrast, new governance "aspires instead to be more open-tex-
tured, participatory, bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, flexi-
ble, integrative, and pragmatic. '26 New governance rejects both top-
down regulation and complete deregulation, attempting to forge a
middle ground through cooperative control mechanisms such as nego-
tiated rulemaking, disclosure regimes, and audited self-regulation.27
A number of academic theories fall under the new governance um-
brella, which applies across the governance spectrum, from law pro-
mulgation to compliance.28
Responsive regulation has been viewed as a particularly powerful
strain of thought within new governance theory.29 Like new govern-
ance generally, responsive regulation is not a fixed set of prescriptions
for regulating. 30 Rather, responsive regulation has been described as
"an attitude that enables the blossoming of a wide variety of regula-
24 Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World:
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471, 496 (2004).
25 Id. at 473-74.
26 Id. at 474.
27 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Govern-
ance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 345, 443 (2004).
28 See, e.g., id. at 345-47.
29 See Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace 139 (2010).
30 Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1, at 5.
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tory approaches. '31 Central to this theory is the belief that regulated
parties have different motivations for acting, and that even the same
party may respond to different incentives in different situations.32 At
times, actors may be motivated by economic self-interest; at others
they may display a commitment to obey the law. Moreover, an actor's
motivation can depend on the regulation employed. As a result, regu-
lation should both respond to and seek to affect the regulated
parties.33
A central tenet of responsive regulation is that regulators should
employ persuasion as a principal, and, indeed, primary means of gar-
nering compliance from regulated parties. As described by Ayers and
Braithwaite, "[t]o adopt punishment as a strategy of first choice is
unaffordable, unworkable, and counterproductive in undermining the
good will of those with a commitment to compliance. '34 Responsive
regulation advocates relying on various forms of persuasion to gain
compliance. In particular, responsive regulation emphasizes procedu-
ral justice as a central means of encouraging voluntary compliance. 35
The procedural justice literature, set forth by Tom Tyler and others,
argues procedural justice (including trust, fairness, respect, and neu-
trality), and not just substantive outcome, has a key impact on percep-
tions of government and legitimacy, and citizens are more likely to
obey the law voluntarily when they perceive an authority as
legitimate. 36
Responsive regulation, however, does not emphasize encouraging
compliance only through persuasion and procedural justice. Ayres
and Braithwaite have been quite explicit that "[t]o reject punitive reg-
ulation is naive. '' 37 As a result, punishment is as important as persua-
sion. 38 Indeed, responsive regulation's most distinctive characteristic
is its enforcement pyramid,39 which provides a concrete path to nego-
tiate between the ideal of appealing to regulated parties' better selves
and the possibility of defection. Responsive regulation explains that
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., id. at 4 (noting both that "[g]overnment should.., be attuned to the differ-
ing motivations of regulated actors" and that "[rlegulations themselves can affect. . . moti-
vations of the regulated.").
33 Id.
34 Id. at 26.
35 See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, Defiance in Taxation and Governance 51-52 (2009)
(noting the influence of procedural justice work on responsive regulation).
36 Tyler has written extensively about procedural justice. His foundational work, setting
forth many of these ideas, is Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
37 Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1, at 25.
38 See John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade 84-94 (1985).
39 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation 30 (2002) (calling the
regulatory pyramid "[t]he most distinctive part of responsive regulation").
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encouraging compliance through persuasion is both less expensive40
and more respectful41 than enforcement.42 As a result, regulators
should first attempt to gain compliance through persuasion, but
should respond to lack of compliance by escalating up the pyramid
through increasing levels of punitiveness.43 Responsive regulation as-
sumes that, as a result of both the persuasive appeal and the punitive
threat, most regulatory action will occur at the persuasive base of the
pyramid, leaving the punitive peak for only the intractable actors.44
The responsive regulation architects recognized the inherent dan-
gers of having regulated parties both cooperate and negotiate compli-
ance with regulators, who are imbued with broad discretion. Ayres
and Braithwaite acknowledged that both cooperation and discretion
"promote the evolution of capture and ... corruption. ' 45 They set
forth tripartism as a solution. Tripartism means involving appropriate
public interest groups at the negotiating table, enabling them to be-
come "credible watchdogs" in the regulatory process.46 At its best,
the "relevant public interest groups... become the fully fledged third
player in the game" with the capacity to "directly punish the firm."'47
Responsive regulation has heavily influenced the tax compliance
literature, resulting in a body of work addressing responsive tax ad-
ministration. This theory emphasizes that different taxpayers have
different motivational postures, which the regulator must manage to
affect taxpayer behavior.48 As a result, responsive tax administration
advocates developing trust in the relationship between tax administra-
tors and taxpayers49 and offering tax administrators a range of options
to respond to compliance issues, rather than just an audit-and-penalty
40 Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1, at 26.
41 See id. at 25 ("When punishment... is in the foreground of regulatory encounters...
people will find this humiliating, will resent and resist in ways that include abandoning self-
regulation.").
42 This insight is also consistent with the procedural justice literature. See Tom Tyler,
Trust and Democratic Governance, in Trust & Governance 269,272 (Valerie Braithwaite &
Margaret Levi eds., 1998) [hereinafter Trust & Governance]; Tyler, note 36, at 22-23 (indi-
cating that social control is too costly to be used all the time to ensure that people obey the
law).
43 See Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1, at 6, 21-22, 25, 26, 33, 35-36 (1992); John
Braithwaite, Institutionalizing Distrust, Enculturating Trust, in Trust & Governance, note
42, at 343, 352; Braithwaite, note 39, at 30-32.
44 Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1, at 35-36.
45 Id. at 55.
46 Id. at 56, 100.
47 Id. at 56.
48 See Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities, in Taxing Democracy, note 7,
at 15-17.
49 See Kristina Murphy, The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Ac-
cused Tax Avoiders, 28 Law & Hum. Behav. 187, 188-89 (2004).
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model.50 Responsive tax administration reaches this balance by ex-
plicitly incorporating the idea of a regulatory pyramid, for example
with education and service at the base, a variety of more interactive
compliance programs (such as real-time compliance reviews) in the
middle, and audit and punishment at the top.51
A number of tax administrations around the globe have explicitly
remade themselves under the image of responsive tax administration,
providing good examples of relatively complete adoptions of the the-
ory.5 2 Australia, in particular, exemplifies explicit adoption of the re-
sponsive tax administration theory.5 3 Responsive tax administration
also impacted other countries, though often in a less explicit fashion.
OECD tax compliance materials soon incorporated responsive tax ad-
ministration theory54 as did National Taxpayer Advocate reports to
the U.S. Congress.5 5 Internationally, tax administrators have begun to
offer an increasing number of alternative, cooperative compliance
50 See Braithwaite, note 7, at 177, 185; Neal Shover, Jenny Job & Anne Carroll, The
ATO Compliance Model in Action: A Case Study of Building and Construction, in Taxing
Democracy, note 7, at 159, 162.
51 Braithwaite, note 3, at 3-5.
52 See Jenny Job & David Honaker, Short-Term Experience with Responsive Regula-
tion in the Australian Taxation Office, in Taxing Democracy, note 7, at 111.
53 New Zealand and East Timor also explicitly adopted responsive tax administration
compliance models. Jenny Job, Andrew Stout & Rachel Smith, Culture Change in Three
Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to Responsive Regulation, 29
Law & Pol'y 84, 90-92 (2007). The ATO worked directly with the responsive tax adminis-
tration architects to remodel the ATO, id. at 90, and adopted a compliance model based on
responsive regulation. The compliance model directives were: (1) understanding taxpayer
behavior, (2) building partnerships with the community, (3) developing flexibility to en-
courage and support compliance, and (4) developing a variety of escalating means of en-
forcing compliance. John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue 71 (2005). The
compliance model was an outgrowth of the Cash Economy Taskforce. See Cash Economy
Task Force, Austl. Tax'n Office, Improving Tax Compliance in the Cash Economy 18-21
(1997), available at http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39065.pdf; Cash Economy
Task Force, Austl. Tax'n Office, Improving Tax Compliance in the Cash Economy 24-26
(1998), available at http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39073.pdf. The ATO de-
veloped an interactive training program to inculcate these principles in ATO newcomers as
well a$'seasoned agency officials. Job et al.; supra, at 90. It funded the Centre for Tax
System Integrity to evaluate the Compliance Model and incorporate public interest, busi-
ness, and accounting groups into the process as a form of tripartism. Braithwaite, supra, at
71.
54 Forum on Tax Admin. Compliance Sub-Group, OECD, Compliance Risk Manage-
ment: Managing and Improving Tax Compliance 70 (2004), available at www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/44/19/33818656.pdf.
55 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Liter-
ature Review and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers in 2
Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, 2007 Annual Report to Congress 138, 149-50 (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utllarc 2007-vol_2.pdf (specifically focusing on the importance
of procedural justice).
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programs for large business taxpayers.56 These programs are clearly
consistent with a move away from a command-and-control regime and
toward cooperative compliance partnerships, though they are rarely
linked explicitly to responsive tax administration. Recently, the
OECD endorsed an "enhanced relationship" model of tax administra-
tion, which is rooted in responsive tax administration and is based on
the notion that tax agencies and taxpayers should act as partners in
the regulatory process. 5 7
Countries outside the United States have moved beyond the origi-
nal vision of responsive tax administration, to incorporate additional
strategies, including, most notably, risk management. Australia, for
example, incorporated explicit risk management practices into its re-
sponsive tax administration regime. 58 Risk management examines
both the likelihood that a taxpayer is noncompliant and the relative
consequences of the noncompliance, in order to focus resources on
taxpayers that present relatively higher risks.59 After applying this
risk management strategy to guide resource allocation, the tax admin-
istrator then relies on the compliance pyramid to direct the tax admin-
istrator's behavior. 60
56 For extensive description of this international trend and the worldwide programs ex-
emplifying this trend, see Deborah M. Nolan & Frank M. Ng, Tax Dispute Resolution: A
New Chapter Emerges, 130 Tax Notes 1053, 1055 (Feb. 28, 2011).
57 Justin Dabner & Mark Burton, Lessons for Tax Administrators in Adopting the
OECD's "Enhanced Relationship" Model-Australia's and New Zealand's Experiences,
63 Bull. for Int'l Tax'n 316, 316 (2009). Prominent former IRS officials (and now practi-
tioners) have characterized CAP as part of this "enhanced relationship" movement. See
Nolan & Ng, note 57, at 1058.
58 See Nolan & Ng, note 56, at 1058-61.
59 For a good, recent discussion of this risk management strategy, see Stuart Hamilton,
New Dimensions in Regulatory Compliance-Building the Bridge to Better Compliance,
10 ejournal Tax Res. 483 (2012). Under this strategy, Australia now applies continuous
review for its large corporate taxpayers with both high likelihood of noncompliance and
large consequences of noncompliance, continuous monitoring for its large corporate tax-
payers with lower likelihood of noncompliance and large consequences of noncompliance,
periodic review for its large corporate taxpayers with high likelihood of noncompliance
and smaller consequences of noncompliance, and periodic monitoring for its large corpo-
rate taxpayers with lower likelihood of noncompliance and smaller consequences of non-
compliance. Id. at 501-05.
60 Id. at 488-93. This Article does not focus in particular on differences between the
implementation of responsive tax administration in the United States and in other coun-
tries. This issue, which is ripe for examination, is left for another day. For this Article, it is
important to recognize that the IRS, in many ways, has drawn from responsive tax adminis-
tration theory, though its particular implementation has been different than in other coun-
tries and is often both less explicit and complete. See Nolan & Ng, note 56, at 1055-56.
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B. Related Theories
Responsive tax administration's emphasis on persuasive means to
gain compliance overlaps significantly with related tax compliance re-
search.61 Most notably, responsive tax administration is connected to
an increasing focus on reciprocity and service to engender compliance.
Reciprocity, which has been described as "one of the most potent of
the weapons of influence," can be understood, at a basic level as
"[t]he rule that says that we should try to repay, in kind, what another
person has provided us."'62 The tax compliance literature in recent
years has extensively considered how reciprocity can be used to gar-
ner compliance from taxpayers.63 Responsive tax administration pro-
ponents have incorporated the principle of reciprocity, explaining that
positive behavior by tax authorities will cause taxpayers to reciprocate
with strong commitments to tax compliance. 64 Positive behavior, in
this context, has been described as "offering cooperation, positive and
helpful service, and open dialogue as a first response to conflicts. '65
Relatedly, the general tax compliance literature has emphasized how
providing service to taxpayers can elicit greater compliance. 66 Re-
sponsive tax administration has also embraced this reasoning, arguing
that tax administrators can use service as an important form of
persuasion. 67
61 See, e.g., Holmes, note 4, at 1420 n.13, 1436 (equating cooperative tax regulation,
reciprocity, service, and procedural justice).
62 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion 17 (2007).
63 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 Emory L.J. 265,
322-26 (2011) (examining, in part, the impact of privacy on individual tax compliance under
taxpayer reciprocity theory); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 81 (2003) (explaining that a taxpayer is "[a]n emo-
tional and moral reciprocator"); Raskolnikov, note 5, at 698-701 (discussing reciprocity as
a motivation for taxpaying).
64 See, e.g., Leviner, note 4, at 415-16.
65 Id. at 416-17.
66 See, e.g., Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Com-
pliance, in Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement 223, 227-29 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992); Peggy A. Hite, A Positive Approach to Taxpayer Compliance, 2 Pub.
Fin. 249, 249-51 (1989). Alex Raskolnikov has proposed a comprehensive set of tax re-
gimes to encourage taxpayer compliance. Raskolnikov, note 5, at 713, 754. He suggests
that one "regime should emphasize taxpayer service." Id. at 713. As discussed further at
note 246, however, Raskolnikov recognizes that service alone is not an appropriate means
of separating and targeting taxpayers.
67 Leviner, note 4, at 415-16.
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C. The CAP Program
Against this background, the Service reformed the U.S. large busi-
ness administration 68 (known as the Large Business and International
Division (LB&I), and CAP was born. The United States has become
a world leader in reforming its large business compliance sector, mov-
ing away from a command-and-control model toward an emphasis on
cooperation and negotiation. 69 The reformation of large business tax
administration, in particular, is especially noteworthy because of the
impact that large business tax administration has on revenue. As is
widely known, the United States is currently facing a fiscal crisis.70
Recently, examinations of large corporations generated over 60% of
the recommended additional taxes from all IRS examinations. 71 The
budget impact of changes resulting from the large business tax admin-
istration "revolution," then, is significant as a general matter and es-
pecially significant in a fiscal crisis.
68 Outside of large business tax administration, certain elements of the IRS efforts also
seem consistent with responsive tax administration. For example, according to the Service,
its mission is to "[p]rovide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping them under-
stand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to
all." IRS, The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-
Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). The Service also
says that its "role is to help the large majority of compliant taxpayers with the tax law,
while ensuring that the minority who are unwilling to comply pay their fair share." Id. The
Service's broader service and enforcement message arose out of the bad press it received in
the late 1990's and the subsequent 1998 IRS Restructuring Act. See IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat 685 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the Code). For a good description of these events, see Bryan T. Camp,
Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Re-
structuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 78-91 (2004). Despite the fact that
the Service's dual invocation of service and enforcement appears to be an across-the-board
commitment, the IRS has actually most deliberately reformed the large business tax com-
pliance sector. Some have even suggested that the IRS has inequitably focused on re-
forming large business tax administration based on a service-and-partnership model, to the
exclusion of other taxpayers. See, e.g., Christopher Bergin, Working Inside LMSB-A
Primer and More, 109 Tax Notes 261 (Oct. 10, 2005) (explaining that the series of new
large business initiatives developed by the IRS "did nothing to change my standing conclu-
sion that taxpayers governed by [the large business division] are the Gold Card members
under the IRS's business model").
69 See, e.g., Nolan & Ng, note 56, at 1056 (describing the large number of new U.S.
compliance programs, compared to other countries).
70 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Tax Reform Implications of the Risk of a U.S. Budget Ca-
tastrophe, 50 U. Louisville L. Rev. 577, 577-81 (2012).
71 TIGTA Suggests Improvements to LMSB Currency Initiative (Sept. 26, 2008), 2008
TNT 207-17, Oct. 24 2008, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File; see U.S. Gov't Accounta-
bility Office, Highlights of the Joint Forum on Tax Compliance: Options for Improvement
and Their Budgetary Potential 7 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08703sp.pdf (suggesting "focusing more audit resources on the business income tax area
... [because] very large amounts of money are controlled by some businesses and flow
among some of the large businesses and related entities").
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The transformation is characterized by an increasing rejection of au-
dits and penalties as the first line of defense against noncompliance.
Instead, the IRS is offering an expanding suite of compliance pro-
grams. These programs are designed to encourage compliance by of-
fering taxpayers greater service and certainty regarding their tax
liabilities. In exchange, they require taxpayers to be more transparent
with the IRS, ideally allowing it to better focus its scarce enforcement
resources on taxpayers and tax issues meriting greater attention.
These programs include Limited Issue Focused Examinations, 72 Fast
Track Settlements, 73 APAs, 74 Pre-Filing Agreements, 75 Industry Issue
Resolutions,76 and the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP).77 Al-
though, the emphasis on flexibility, persuasion, and the move away
from an audit-and-penalty model reflect the influence of responsive
tax administration theory,78 the IRS has never explicitly adopted this
theory while undergoing this transformation.79
72 This program provides taxpayers with a streamlined, focused audit process. I.R.M.
4.51.3.1.1 (2007). After undergoing a risk analysis, a taxpayer and the Service enter into a
Memorandum of Understanding delineating the limited scope of audit the taxpayer will
face, as well as the taxpayer's obligation to cooperate with the Service. I.R.M. 4.51.3
(2007).
73 This program offers large and mid-size business taxpayers the opportunity to expedite
resolution of their tax issues, by having an Appeals official mediate between the taxpayer
and Service personnel at an early point in the normal dispute resolution cycle. Rev. Proc.
2003-40, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1044.
74 APAs are agreements entered into by taxpayers and the Service in order to resolve
transfer pricing issues cooperatively, in advance of return filing, rather than in an adver-
sarial, post-return fashion. Rev. Proc. 2008-31, 2008-23 I.R.B. 1133. APAs have existed
since the early 1990's. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Should Advance Pricing Agreements
Be Published, 19 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 171, 177 (1998). As commentators have noted, in
large part they arose as a result of the extreme difficulties of policing a very complex
transfer pricing regime. Id. at 173. As a result, APAs, by themselves, do not signal a move
toward a broad-based, cooperative compliance regime with taxpayers. Nonetheless, be-
cause APAs involve advance negotiation with taxpayers regarding tax liability, they are
often cited as part of an alternative suite of programs taxpayers can use to reach coopera-
tive resolution with the Service. See, e.g., Nolan & Ng, note 57, at 1053-54.
75 This program allows taxpayers to resolve, prior to return filing, issues that would
likely be disputed in a post-filing audit. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324.
76 Industry Issue Resolutions provides a means for business taxpayers, industry associa-
tions, and the like to seek guidance regarding issues that produce uncertainty across a
significant number of taxpayers. Rev. Proc. 2003-36, 2003-18 I.R.B. 859.
77 As described previously, CAP is a cooperative, real-time compliance review, designed
to reach certainty as to a taxpayer's tax liability prior to return filing.
78 See, e.g., Ventry, note 4, at 465-66 (indicating that the Service has "rolled out" a suite
of large business tax administration programs that fit within a responsive tax administra-
tion framework because they "offer taxpayers and advisors the opportunity to participate
directly in the resolution of tax issues," providing "taxpayers and the government in-
creased certainty of outcome as well as lower costs," thereby "discourag[ing] impermissible
planning activity by offering tangible incentives for choosing compliance over avoidance").
79 See Dean, note 6, at 410 n.107.
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CAP is the most important of these programs, both because the IRS
has indicated that it will become the way of the future for large busi-
ness tax administration 80 and because it represents the culmination of
the Service's embrace of a cooperative model of tax administration.
As a result, scholars have rooted CAP in a responsive tax administra-
tion framework. 81 Since CAP is the most emblematic and significant
example of the influence of responsive tax administration in the
United States, 82 analyzing this program is both a useful and important
way to begin a critique of the Service's remodeling under the influ-
ence of responsive tax administration.
CAP functions as follows: LB&I taxpayers that are either publicly
held or agree to submit audited financial statements to the Service on
a quarterly basis can apply to be in CAP. 83 The Service decides
whether to accept a taxpayer into CAP.84 Upon entering into CAP,
the taxpayer signs a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which
specifies the parameters for the taxpayer's disclosure of information,
establishes disclosure procedures, and indicates the taxpayer's good
faith participation.8 5 In CAP, taxpayers have to reveal to the Service
in real time all material business transactions and other tax issues that
arise, as well as the taxpayer's proposed tax positions.86 The goal is to
resolve all tax issues prior to return filing.87 If the taxpayer and the
80 See, e.g., Michael Joe, Amy S. Elliott, Jeremiah Coder & Kristen A. Parillo, IRS Re-
sponds to Doubts About Uncertain Tax Position Proposal, 127 Tax Notes 243 (Apr. 19,
2010) (indicating that the IRS is working to determine the factors that made CAP success-
ful in order to "expand that success systemwide").
81 Book, note 4, at 113 (citing to CAP as a positive example of the government creating
a "dynamic of compliance" within the responsive tax administration framework); Holmes,
note 4, at 1432 (discussing CAP as a "significant cooperation-based initiative" in an article
praising responsive tax administration); Ventry, note 4, at 465 (supporting CAP as a way to
"break down further [the Service's] adversarial image" in an article articulating a respon-
sive tax administration model).
82 Other countries around the world have also begun to embrace the CAP model. The
Netherlands has adopted a "Horizontal Monitoring" program, whereby business taxpayers
agree to full disclosure of all material tax issues in exchange for the Dutch Tax Administra-
tion's timely provision of advice. Nolan & Ng, note 56, at 1056-57. In 2009, South Korea
began a very similar program in pilot form, called the "Horizontal Compliance Program."
Id. at 1056-57. In 2008, Australia launched the "Annual Compliance Arrangement" for
select large business taxpayers with sound risk management processes, through which the
ATO provides certainty as to low-risk matters in exchange for full disclosure of potential
tax issues. Id. at 1058.
83 Compliance Assurance Process (CAP)-Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Compliance-Assurance-Process-(CAP)--Fre-
quently-Asked-Questions-(FAQs) (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). Additionally, the taxpayer
must not be in litigation with the federal government in a way that would materially limit
IRS access to the taxpayer's records. Id.
84 Id.
85 I.R.M. 4.51.8.5 (2012).
86 I.R.M. 4.51.8.1 (2012).
87 Id.
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Service cannot reach agreement on all tax issues prior to return filing,
then the taxpayer will undergo normal, post-filing examination on the
unresolved issues.88 If the taxpayer meets IRS expectations in CAP,
the taxpayer can enter into the compliance maintenance phase, which
involves a lower level of IRS review. 89 In this phase, taxpayers must
continue making disclosures of material completed business transac-
tions and tax issues.90 Taxpayers can move in and out of the compli-
ance maintenance phase based on a number of factors, including the
complexity of the taxpayer's tax situation. 91 Taxpayers can terminate
their involvement in CAP by written request, and the Service can ter-
minate a taxpayer's involvement as a result of failure to abide by the
CAP requirements. 92
CAP's popularity has been steadily increasing. 93 Tax administrators
have argued that CAP is the "most significant example of re-engineer-
ing the audit process" 94 and a "win-win program" for taxpayers and
the IRS.95 The Service has indicated both that taxpayer satisfaction
with CAP is "overwhelmingly high" 96 and that CAP will improve vol-
untary compliance while cutting audit cycle time.97 Tax practitioners
have repeatedly seconded the IRS claims about CAP's tax administra-
88 I.R.M. 4.51.8.7 (2012).
89 I.R.M. 4.51.8.3 (2012) (indicating that, in the compliance maintenance phase, "the
IRS reduces the level of review based on the complexity and number of issues, and the
taxpayer's history of compliance, cooperation and transparency in the CAP"); see also
Marie Sapirie, IRS Officials Discuss Goals and Impact of Issue Practice Groups, CAP
(Nov. 3, 2011), 2011 TNT 214-3, Nov. 4, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (indi-
cating that the compliance maintenance phase "will involve significantly less scope and
depth of reviews on exam").
90 I.R.M. 4.51.8.6 (2012).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 IRS News Release IR-2011-32 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/
IRS-Expands-and-Makes-Permanent-Its-Compliance-Assurance-Process-(CAP)-for-
Large-Corporate-Taxpayers.
94 Sheryl Stratton, Cost of Certainty Is Transparency, IRS Says (Apr. 12, 2007), 2007
TNT 72-2, Apr. 13, 2007, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
95 IRS News Release IR-2006-94 (June 13, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/
IRS-Commissioner-Testifies-before-Senate-Committee-on-Finance-on-Compliance-Con-
cerns-Relative-to-Large-and-Mid-Size-Businesses; Hearing on Tax Policy and Enforcement
Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2007) (written testimony of Kathy
Petronchak), available at 2007 TNT 44-27, Mar. 6, 2007, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File; Shulman Discusses Tax Compliance at ABA Meeting (May 9, 2008), 2008 TNT 92-69,
May 12, 2008, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
96 Amy S. Elliott, Tiered-Issue Process Will Be Standard in the Future, Says IRS Official
(Dec. 10, 2008), 2008 TNT 239-5, Dec. 11, 2008, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
97 Heidi Glenn & Warren Rojas, Everson Delays Local EITC Certification Pilot, Sup-
ports Other IRSAC Ideas (Nov. 10, 2004), 2004 TNT 219-1, Nov. 12, 2004, available in
LEXIS, Tax Analysts File; see also Cliff Jernigan, Corporate Tax Audit Survival 77 (2005)
(in which former IRS official states that "CAP should help the Service shorten the time it
takes to audit corporate returns, with fewer staff resources, improve overall compliance
results, and help identify abusive tax shelter transactions more quickly").
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tion benefits.98 The tax press has noted that CAP has been heralded
as "one of the most successful corporate tax enforcement innovations"
since the creation of the large business division in 2000.99 The aca-
demic literature has also provided consistent support for CAP.100
With the program's finalization in 2011 and its shift, at that point,
from a program by invitation only to a program open to all LB&I
taxpayers, it is poised to expand in the large business taxpayer base.
Indeed, the Service's announcement that it had finalized and opened
the program to application was acclaimed by taxpayers for meeting
the "pent-up demand to get into the program."'101 The Service has
indicated both that it "expects to see a growth spurt" in the pro-
gram, 10 2 and that it hopes to "expand [on CAP's] success
systemwide."' 0 3
D. Claimed Benefits of CAP and Limitations of Benefits
The IRS, practitioners, and tax compliance scholars have offered
several reasons to celebrate this expansion. As this Section explains,
however, the essentially universal praise for CAP leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. The Service has indicated that CAP reduces the
use of time and resources to resolve tax issues, 0 4 allows the IRS to
focus its resources on problematic areas, 0 5 and helps taxpayers by
minimizing the uncertainty they face for the purposes of their finan-
cial statements. 10 6 Practitioners second many of these benefits and
emphasize that, particularly in the compliance maintenance phase, the
98 See, e.g., Trivedi & Elliott, note 23, at 12 (describing the consistent support of practi-
tioners for CAP and their characterizations of the tax administration benefits of CAP,
including that it can streamline and reduce expenditures on large case audits); see also
Testimony of Kenneth W. Gideon, Chair, ABA Sect. of Tax'n, Before the IRS Oversight
Bd. at its Pub. Stakeholder Meeting, available at 2005 TNT 21-32, Feb. 1, 2005, available in
LEXIS, Tax Analysts File ("applaud[ing]" the Service for its "bold new" CAP initiative "as
part of its efforts to streamline tax administration").
99 Amy S. Elliott, Areas of Tension in IRS's CAP Program May Cause Growing Pains
(Jan. 19, 2011), 2011 TNT 13-1, Jan. 20, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
100 See notes 4-5.
101 Trivedi & Elliott, note 23, at 12.
102 Douglas H. Shulman, IRS Conmm'r, Speech Before the Tax Exec. Inst. Mid-Year
Meeting (Apr. 4, 2011), in 2011 TNT 65-16, Apr. 4, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File.
103 See, e.g., Joe et al., note 80, at 249.
104 Sheryl Stratton, Policy Outlook: Taxpayer Transparency Clear; IRS Transparency
Cloudy (Apr. 13, 2007), 2007 TNT 73-1, Apr. 16, 2007, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File; Sam Young, LMSB Commissioner Discusses Revisions to Coordinated Issues, En-
forcement Program, 2008 TNT 100-5, May 22, 2008, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
105 IRS, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Reducing the Federal Tax Gap: A Report on Improving
Voluntary Compliance 36 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax-gap-re-
port final 080207 linked.pdf.
106 Shulman, note 95.
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streamlined process will save taxpayer resources. 10 7 Scholars have
noted that real-time audit programs can provide the Service with valu-
able, current information about compliance issues,10 8 that CAP "dif-
fer[s] radically from the disclose-and-settle-or-we'll-get-you"
approach and may help "sustain strong tax compliance norms."10 9
Perhaps most fundamentally, scholars have argued that, as a respon-
sive tax administration program, CAP "discourages impermissible
planning activity by offering tangible incentives for choosing compli-
ance over avoidance."' 10
Many of these claimed benefits are indisputably desirable, but are
somewhat ancillary to CAP's fundamental paradigm shift. For exam-
ple, the increased efficiency from examining transactions soon after
they are entered into could occur in a traditional audit. Even in tradi-
tional audits, the Service could hire more auditors (thereby making
audit cycles shorter), it could place a priority on expedited document
requests, or it could require extensive documentation and interviews
as part of the return filing."' Without fundamentally shifting to a co-
operative, responsive tax administration program, these approaches
could result in both more timely review and more current information
for the Service.
For many of the other claimed benefits, however, their value could
be outweighed by more substantial costs. For example, reducing the
burden that taxpayers face in filing their tax returns and reducing the
IRS time and resources used to audit taxpayers are clearly laudable
goals. The crucial question is at what cost any resource savings are
achieved. In the extreme, if CAP review is so light as to encourage
large expenditures on creating tax shelters, taxpayers may actually be
wasting more resources than they would have under a system with a
107 Trivedi & Elliott, note 23, at 3; Mark A. Weinberger, Global Vice Chairman Tax
Serv., Ernst & Young, Address at the Ernst & Young Domestic Tax Conference (June
2008), in 120 Tax Notes 893 (Sept. 1, 2008); Gideon, note 98; Timothy J. McCormally, Exec.
Dir., Tax Executives Inst., Statement Before the IRS Oversight Board (Feb. 1, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/meetings/2-01-05/statement-tei.pdf.
108 Braithwaite, note 53, at 128; Braithwaite, note 7, at 186.
109 Morse, note 5, at 1012-13.
110 Ventry, note 4, at 198; see also Holmes, note 4, at 1420 (positing superiority of a
cooperative tax regime).
111 Indeed, the Service has recently announced a number of mechanisms it intends to
use to streamline the audit and appeal process for the largest business taxpayers, which do
not require a fundamental shift to a cooperative regime. These include "tweaking the in-
formation document request (IDR) process to more fully develop cases in Exam, increas-
ing the use of summonses when taxpayers aren't providing information on a timely basis,
and prohibiting Appeals from considering new facts or legal arguments not presented or
addressed in an examination." Amy S. Elliott, IRS to Revise Corporate Audit Practices,
Focus Savings on International, Midmarket Businesses (Mar. 27, 2012), 2012 TNT 59-1,
Mar. 27, 2012, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
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high tax filing burden, 1t 2 simply transferring revenue from the govern-
ment to taxpayers, at great social cost. On the government side of the
ledger, the administrative cost savings in CAP may be more than out-
weighed by the lost revenue from any increased tax sheltering by tax-
payers, which then must be collected elsewhere. This danger is
particularly acute during a time of severe budget crisis, in which the
government direly needs revenue, but is unlikely to be able to raise it
from new sources. 113
Fundamentally, claims that CAP may reduce taxpayer and IRS re-
sources otherwise spent on audit cannot alone justify CAP. Whether
or not CAP makes sense depends centrally on its impact on compli-
ance. And, of course, claims that CAP reduces expenditures on audit
should not foreclose efforts to increase CAP's effectiveness.
Along similar lines, while taxpayers and the Service alike praise
CAP for providing taxpayers greater certainty regarding their finan-
cial reserves,114 it is not clear whether this certainty produces a net
benefit. If taxpayers are simply getting up-front certainty regarding
outcomes that otherwise would occur after audit and providing the
certainty does not prevent the Service from important audits of other
taxpayers, the benefit may be unequivocal. If, however, the process of
achieving certainty allows taxpayers to get better results than they
otherwise would, thereby encouraging more nefarious tax planning, or
if the provision of certainty otherwise interferes with the Service's
broader compliance agenda, the benefit very well may not be worth
the cost.
At bottom, then, important questions remain: Does CAP increase
CAP taxpayers' compliance without unduly burdening the Service's
broader commitment to ensure compliance across all taxpayers?
More generally, is the United States applying responsive tax adminis-
tration to large businesses in a manner likely to increase or undermine
tax compliance in this crucial taxpaying sphere? The next three Parts
examine these questions by highlighting problems with CAP, which
are emblematic of both potential weaknesses of responsive tax admin-
istration theory and its implementation in the U.S. large business
sector.
112 See note 216. Tax shelters are extremely profitable. As a result, from an economic
perspective, large business taxpayers have significant reason to enter into tax shelters even
if they have large administrative costs.
113 See, e.g., Shaviro, note 70, at 577-79 (describing urgent need for revenue as well as
political system dysfunction making it difficult to raise it).
114 Alison Bennett, TRAC Asserts "Historic Collapse in Audits"; Shott Says Interpreta-
tion of Data Is Wrong, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 15, 2008, at 6-10 (in which IRS Large
and Mid-Size Business Division (now LB&I) Commissioner Barry Shott stated, regarding
CAP, that "we decided corporate America needed to have certainty and we made the
decision to go forward").
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III. REDUCED ACCOUNTABILITY
The first problem with CAP is that the IRS has reduced accounta-
bility regarding the yield from the its compliance efforts, based in part
on faith in cooperative tax regulation to yield compliance. This tracks
a more general measure of faith in the tax compliance literature for
responsive tax administration's ability to deliver greater compliance.
As this Part shows, however, this faith in responsive tax administra-
tion currently outpaces the empirical evidence. While the evidence
certainly does not conclusively defeat the responsive tax administra-
tion project, it also does not compel faith in its predictions. At a theo-
retical level, then, both responsive tax administration and CAP should
be met with greater skepticism than presently exists. In particular,
responsive tax administration programs, like CAP, may provide ag-
gressive large business taxpayers with the opportunity to reduce their
tax liability inappropriately by manipulating norms of reciprocity,
shrouded behind secrecy from public scrutiny. This alternative possi-
bility should receive greater attention.
The Service has repeatedly indicated that CAP will result in re-
duced data regarding large business tax administration. 15 Part of the
reason for this is practical. With traditional audits, auditors collect a
certain amount of money from audit. The Service then produces ex-
tensive statistics regarding amounts earned from audit.116 These sta-
tistics provide clear indications of the direct revenue raised from
particular enforcement activities.117 With CAP, these sorts of statis-
tics are not available. Since taxpayers and the IRS agree on tax liabil-
ity prior to the taxpayer filing the tax return, there generally will be no
amount collected as a result of audit. Practically, then, the Service
cannot produce the same type of statistics with CAP.
However, IRS discussion of the reduced data that will accompany
CAP evinces more than just practical constraints. A clear underpin-
ning of the Service's explanation is that stakeholders simply do not
need the same level of accountability with CAP, given its transforma-
115 See, e.g., Douglas H. Shulman, IRS Comm'r, Speech Before the Tax Exec. Inst. (Oct.
21, 2008), 2008 TNT 205-36, Oct. 21, 2008, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File; Shulman,
note 102; Bennett, note 114.
116 This information, along with much more statistical information about tax data, is
available through the IRS Statistics of Income program, http://www.irs.gov/uaclTax-Stats-2/
(last updated Oct. 2, 2012).
117 Of course, direct revenue raised from audits is only one part of the equation. While
the indirect effect of audits is harder to determine, a number of studies have undertaken
the task. Recently, Jeffrey Dubin determined that over 90% of the revenue raised from
increased audit rates arises from the spillover, or indirect deterrence effect. Jeffrey A.
Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer Noncompliance 20
(2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04dubin.pdf. See text accompanying
notes 256-63 for further discussion of direct versus indirect revenue effects.
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tive, compliance powers. For example, IRS Commissioner Douglas
Shulman explained that, with CAP, "we have changed the game-
there are no adjustments, because we are making sure that the right
amount of tax is paid on the front-end to avoid adjustments on the
back end."' 18 This statement is rooted in Shulman's belief that
"[r]elationships and paradigms are shifting [as the Service and taxpay-
ers] break down barriers and open doors." 9 Shulman has indicated
that the Service is "retooling its relationships with large corporate tax-
payers [in a process of] moving away from protracted trench warfare,
which serves neither of us well, to earlier and speedier issue resolution
and greater efficiency and certainty.' 20 In other words, we have ar-
rived at a new day in large business tax compliance. We need not
worry about closely monitoring tax administration outcomes because
CAP taxpayers are working with the Service, rather than against it.
This belief more generally tracks the optimism in the tax compliance
literature regarding responsive tax administration's ability to change
tax compliance from a game of catch-me-if-you-can to a sustained
commitment to meeting tax obligations with integrity. 121
This perspective is somewhat puzzling. As a general matter, empiri-
cal evidence regarding the impact of responsive tax administration re-
mains limited, notwithstanding its now lengthy operation around the
world. 122 Self-surveys designed to measure the impact of procedural
justice on taxpayers' beliefs about tax authorities comprise much of
the evidence that has been developed about responsive tax adminis-
tration. 123 While the procedural justice literature theorizes that proce-
118 See Shulman, note 115.
119 Douglas H. Shulman, IRS Comm'r, Keynote Speech Before the AICPA Fall Tax
Meeting (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Commissioner-of-Internal-
Revenue-Douglas-H.-Shulman's-Keynote-Speech-Before-the-AICPA-Fall-Tax-Meeting.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Ventry, note 4, at 435-38. In line with the responsive tax administration
literature, Ventry concludes that "[i]mproving perceptions of procedural justice among tax-
payers and advisors can be especially effective in facilitating compliance with tax laws." Id.
at 463.
122 Neal Shover et al., note 50, at 173-74 (discussing the limited efforts to build data
collection capabilities into remaking of the ATO as a vehicle of responsive tax administra-
tion). While some responsive tax administration programs, such as Australia's transfer
pricing record review project, appear to have shown large returns, the ATO's failure to
build in controls to test the actual impact of the program limits the empirical conclusions
that can be drawn. See Braithwaite, note 53, at 95. If anything, other countries have been
even less systematic in their evaluation, due to the often less explicit acknowledgement of
remodeling around responsive tax administration principles.
123 Valerie Braithwaite recently published a comprehensive study of the impact of re-
sponsive tax administration on motivational postures, which she describes as "summary
statements of how individuals think about their engagement with regulatory authorities."
Braithwaite, note 35, at 101. As Braithwaite describes, the source of data for this study
comes from a large series of surveys and questionnaires conducted by the Centre for Tax
System Integrity in Australia from 2000 through 2005. Id. at 104-06. Other researchers
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dural justice should increase commitment to compliance, which
should, presumably, actually increase compliance, 124 few responsive
tax administration studies have connected the dots all the way from
procedural justice to actual, increased tax compliance. Many of the
studies that have found a positive relationship between procedural
justice and actual tax compliance have relied on taxpayer self-reports
of compliance and have found a weak relationship between the two.
125
While one experiment found some links between informational and
interpersonal fairness in taxpayer reminder letters and tax compli-
ance, the results in the experiment were nonetheless mixed.126 In-
deed, the experiment found that combining a letter that both
also relied on this survey methodology to reach conclusions about the relationship between
responsive tax administration and beliefs about tax administrators and commitment to tax-
paying. See, e.g., Martina Hartner, Silvia Rechberger, Erich Kirchler & Alfred
Schabmann, Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance, 38 Econ. Analysis & Pol'y 137, 141
(2008); Kristina Murphy, Enforcing Tax Compliance: To Punish or Persuade?, 38 Econ.
Analysis & Pol'y 113, 119 (2008) [hereinafter Enforcing]; Kristina Murphy, Regulating
More Effectively: The Relationship Between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax
Non-Compliance, 32 J.L. & Soc'y 562, 568-71 (2005) [hereinafter Regulating].
124 This belief is inherent in much of the responsive tax administration literature. See,
e.g., Murphy, Regulating, note 123, at 567 (hypothesizing that "a regulatory enforcement
strategy that makes use of the principles outlined in procedural justice theory may there-
fore be more effective in gaining future voluntary compliance than a strategy based purely
on deterrence").
125 See, e.g., Hartner et al., note 123, at 148 (finding a significant (p < 0.001) relationship
between negative attitudes regarding procedural justice of the tax office and tax non-com-
pliance, but not finding that positive attitudes regarding procedural justice of the tax office
affect tax compliance); Murphy, Enforcing, note 123, at 124 (noting the "problematic...
finding that both stigmatization and reintegration explain only a small amount of the varia-
tion in compliance behavior"); Murphy, Regulating, note 123, at 577, 582 (finding, in one
study, weak relationships between tax evasion behavior and other variables in the study,
and, in another study, mixed results, depending on measure of tax evasion used); cf. Smith,
note 66, at 227-29 (finding a significant negative relationship in self-reports between proce-
dural justice and perceived acceptability of under-reporting income, but failing to find a
significant relationship between procedural justice and actual under-reporting); Ronald G.
Worsham, Jr., The Effect of Tax Authority Behavior on Taxpayer Compliance: A Procedu-
ral Justice Approach, 18 J. Am. Tax'n Ass'n 19, 19-20 (1996) (employing consistency and
accuracy as measures of procedural justice and finding mixed impacts on compliance, de-
pending on whether they were experienced directly or indirectly and depending on means
of measurement).
126 Michael Wenzel, Principles of Procedural Fairness in Reminder Letters: A Field-
Experiment 15-20 (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 42, 2002) [hereinafter
Principles]. The results of a portion of this experiment were published at Michael Wenzel,
A Letter from the Tax Office: Compliance Effects of Informational and Interpersonal Jus-
tice, 19 Soc. Just. Res. 345, 357 (2006).
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exhibited informational justice 127 and pointed out a taxpayer right to
informational justice actually reduced compliance for entities. 128
A more disconcerting finding has been glossed over in the litera-
ture. Studies have repeatedly shown evidence that, at least in some
situations, procedural justice may perversely decrease taxpayers' com-
mitment to tax compliance. Consistent with the research in this area,
many of these studies rely on surveys of taxpayers. In an early such
study, Thomas Porcano found that tax evaders tended to have "posi-
tive perceptions of procedural justice. ' 129 In 2002, Michael Wenzel
similarly found that, although there was some evidence of a link be-
tween procedural justice and increased self-reported compliance in
certain situations, procedural justice nonetheless had an "unexpected
positive, average effect ...on underreporting of extra income" as
reported by taxpayers. 130 In 2005, Kristina Murphy found through
survey evidence a "counter-intuitive" positive relationship between
procedural justice and tax evasion. 131 In 2007, Valerie Braithwaite,
Kristina Murphy, and Monika Reinhart made the "surprising finding"
that when taxpayers perceived procedural justice, dismissiveness (a
posture associated with lack of concern for the tax administration and
taxpaying obligations) tended to be high.132 On the other hand, Vale-
rie Braithwaite acknowledged that dismisiveness decreased in Austra-
lia in response to a government enforcement crackdown. 133 The
bottom line is that the limited empirical information currently is not
127 "Informational justice refers to the provision of information about procedures and
(genuine and sound) explanations for decisions." Michael Wenzel, Principles of Procedu-
ral Fairness in Reminder Letters and Awareness of Entitlements: A Prestudy 2 (Austl.
Nat'l Univ. and Austl. Taxation Office, Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 10,
June 2001).
128 Wenzel, Principles, note 126, at 27.
129 Thomas M. Porcano, Correlates of Tax Evasion, 9 J. Econ. Psychol. 47, 62 (1988).
130 Michael Wenzel, The Impact of Outcome Orientation and Justice Concerns on Tax
Compliance: The Role of Taxpayers' Identity, 87 J. Applied Psych. 629, 640 (2002). Wen-
zel explained, "It is not clear why this effect occurred. Perhaps procedural fairness induced
perceptions of benevolence of the tax office that let taxpayers anticipate little punishment
for their tax evasion. But then it remains unclear why this was the case for one but not the
other forms of tax compliance." Id.
131 Murphy, Regulating, note 123, at 577 n.50. Murphy dismissed the result as poten-
tially just a statistical anomaly.
132 Valerie Braithwaite, Kristina Murphy & Monika Reinhart, Taxation Threat, Motiva-
tional Postures, and Responsive Regulation, 29 Law & Pol'y 137, 150 (2007). The authors
hypothesized that either taxpayers viewed the procedural justice as insincere or they
viewed it as a sign of weakness.
133 Braithwaite, note 35, at 116. The connection between procedural justice and compli-
ance is perhaps even more problematic in the case of large businesses, which are repre-
sented by agents. I thank Susan Cleary Morse for raising this point. Indeed, the
responsive tax administration research has offered little regarding the impact of procedural
justice on large businesses, as opposed to individuals, and the impact of agents in the large
business context. See further discussion of this point at note 264.
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robust enouth to justify solid faith in responsive tax administration's
theoretical, transformative powers. 134 While procedural justice may
play an important role in increasing compliance, at present, this possi-
bility remains just that-an uncertain possibility. A counterargument
is that we need not worry about CAP compliance because, even if
CAP does not have transformative powers as a general matter, tax-
payers in CAP are going to be conservative taxpayers. These are tax-
payers that simply want to pay the "correct" amount of tax, not play
games. 135 If this perspective is correct, then we need not concern our-
selves with subversion and reduced compliance through CAP.
There are a number of reasons to doubt the sufficiency of this re-
sponse. As an initial matter, CAP operates in a sphere of tax compli-
ance that invites game playing. 136 Tax law, particularly in the business
context, is riddled with both uncertainties 137 and intentional subsi-
dies 138 that create extensive tax planning opportunities, making the
distinction between "correctly" paying taxes and playing games a false
dichotomy. 139 For example, is a company paying the "correct"
134 Even if the Australian evidence did provide a reasonable level of confidence regard-
ing the compliance powers of responsive tax administration, an important question would
exist about its translatability to the United States, where the much greater number of regu-
latees could pose additional complications in applying the responsive tax administration
framework. Since the Australian evidence currently does not compel a reasonable level of
confidence regarding the powers of the responsive tax administration framework, this Arti-
cle does not examine the potential impact of cultural differences. Providing empirical evi-
dence in the United States as a means of developing greater evidence regarding responsive
tax administration generally would help examine any differences as applied in the United
States, specifically.
135 See, e.g., Raskolnikov, note 5, at 738 ("Needless to say, only companies that 'want to
file [their] tax returns correctly' rather than to minimize their taxes at all costs participate
in [CAP]."). Raskolnikov did indicate, however, ways that "gainers" might take advantage
of disclosing certain positions in prefiling programs, while hiding others. Id. at 739. Other
tax scholars have adopted the view of CAP taxpayers as inherently conservative. See, e.g.,
Holmes, note 4, at 1453 (explaining that conservative taxpayers will choose CAP whereas
aggressive taxpayers will not).
136 See Doreen McBarnet, The Construction of Compliance and the Challenge for Con-
trol: The Limits of Noncompliance Research, in Why People Pay Taxes, note 66, at 333
(noting that compliance "is, itself, a social and legal construct"); Doreen McBarnet, Legiti-
mate Rackets: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Boundaries of Legality, 3 J. Hum.
Just. 56, 72 (1992) ("How do enforcers enforce the law when the law has not been
breached? How do they use strategies to secure compliance when the literal requirements
of law are already being met?").
137 Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 Tax L. Rev. 489,
494 (2011).
138 Any number of subsidies could be described. For example, accelerated depreciation
methods allow companies to depreciate property for tax purposes at a faster means than
depreciation for economic purposes. See IRC § 167 and the regulations thereunder. Non-
recognition rules allow taxpayers to exchange property while deferring gain for tax pur-
poses. See, e.g., IRC §§ 351, 721.
139 See, e.g. Amanda M. Grossman & Steven D. Grossman, Measuring Tax Policy Ag-
gressiveness, 134 Tax Notes 1677, 1678 (Mar. 26, 2012) ("The inherent complexity of tax
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amount of tax if it engages in extensive, albeit legally permissible, tax
planning to locate much of its intellectual property in an offshore tax
haven in order to reduce U.S. corporate taxes? Answering this ques-
tion depends on one's perspective regarding the role of U.S. tax law,
business' ability to respond to U.S. taxation, and what constitutes an
aggressive or conservative tax position, among other things.140  In
short, claiming that CAP taxpayers simply want to pay the "correct"
amount of taxes is not particularly helpful in describing the extent of
their taxpaying compliance.
Moreover, at least at this time, it simply is not clear that CAP tax-
payers are engaged in less game playing than others. As a result of
privacy rules, 1 4 1 the IRS has not publicly released the names of CAP
participants. Consequently, unless companies choose to release infor-
mation about their participation on their own accord through publicly
filed financial documents, 142 information about their CAP participa-
tion is not publicly available. Paul Beck and Petro Lisowsky gained
access to the Service's private data regarding CAP participants be-
tween the years 2007 and 2009 for an empirical paper regarding
CAP. 143 Using this data, they determined that "high prior-period ef-
fective tax rates ... are positively associated with subsequent CAP
participation.' 1 44  A company's effective tax rate, very roughly, is a
measure of the rate of taxation that the company faces on its in-
come. 145 Relatively low effective tax rates can indicate that the tax-
payer is more aggressive about engaging in tax planning designed to
laws provides companies with ample opportunity to assert that the laws are open to more
than one interpretation. That is especially true because companies must navigate their way
through tax codes at the federal, state, local, and international levels. When formulating a
tax strategy, a company's tax specialists may find more than one interpretation of a tax law
viable and, based on those interpretations, choose the position that minimizes the tax
liability.")
140 A large body of scholarship exists regarding these questions. See, e.g., Mihir A.
Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 Nat'l Tax J. 487
(2003); Mitchell Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International
Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 53 (2006); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless In-
come, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 (2011); Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Norma-
tive Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 Tax L. Rev. 155 (2007).
141 IRC § 6103. For further discussion of the privacy rules, see text accompanying notes
267-70
142 See notes 12-16 for representative releases.
143 Beck & Lisowsky, note 5, at 18-25.
144 Id. at 5.
145 In practice, the number of factors that goes into determining effective tax rates can
be very complex. For example, a company's effective tax rate takes into account not only
its rate of taxation, but also, to some extent, its level of conservativeness with respect to
financial statement reserves for uncertain tax benefits. See text accompanying note 203 for
further discussion of this point.
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lower tax liability.1 46 As a result, Beck and Lisowsky's study, at first
glance, seems to bolster arguments that CAP taxpayers are conserva-
tive types merely trying to pay the "correct" amount of taxes. The
answer, however, is not so clear. During the period of the study, CAP
was exclusively available to taxpayers only by IRS invitation. As a
result, the fact that CAP companies tended to have relatively high
effective tax rates may have reflected the Service's choice, rather than
that of taxpayers. Going forward, when CAP participation is open to
all large business taxpayers by application, a much different, and more
aggressive, profile of CAP taxpayers could emerge. 147
If CAP were shown to take such aggressive taxpayers and increase
their compliance, then their participation in CAP might be a good
sign. Given the existing lack of such evidence, however, aggressive
taxpayer participation in CAP creates concern about the potential for
their using CAP to further reduce their compliance. Indeed, anecdo-
tal evidence seems to suggest both that taxpayers with a history of
aggressive tax reduction schemes have some interest in CAP and that
the Service, going forward, welcomes their participation in the pro-
gram. Pfizer, for example, has indicated its participation in CAP in its
public, financial documents.148 Pfizer has been no stranger to aggres-
sive tax planning, garnering press for extensive offshoring of its profits
in order to drive down its effective tax rate. 149 Indeed, Pfizer's effec-
tive tax rate for 2010 was a mere 11.9% as compared to a statutory
rate of 35%.150 While large multinational companies, like Pfizer,
often are expected to have a lower effective tax rate than the statutory
rate, 151 Pfizer's effective tax rate also appears to be significantly lower
than the aggregate effective tax rate of the largest U.S. companies (of
146 Joshua D. Blank, What's Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 Tax L. Rev.
539, 570 (2009).
147 Cf. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Re-
gimes, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 675, 686 (2012) (suggesting that "[tiaxpayers' self-identification in
response to a separation program is at least a quasi-public declaration about their compli-
ance values. And after such a declaration taxpayers will be more likely to internalize such
compliance as consistent with their view of themselves and with their desire to demon-
strate their good reputation.").
'148 Pfizer Inc., note 13, at 60.
149 See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Exporting Profits Imports U.S. Tax Reductions for Pfizer,
Lilly, Oracle, Bloomberg, May 13, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-13/ex-
porting-profits-imports-u-s-tax-reductions-for-pfizer-lilly-oracle.html.
150 Pfizer Inc., Financial Report (Form 10-K, Exhibit 13) (Feb. 28, 2011), at 36. Pfizer
explains this low effective tax rate, in part, as a result of a large reduction in reserves. Id.
151 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rate of the Largest
U.S. and EU Multinationals, 65 Tax L. Rev. 375, 383 (2012). Effective tax rates for the
largest multinational companies are generally expected to be lower than statutory rates as
a result of both intentional advantages provided by U.S. tax law as well as the often exten-
sive planning opportunities available to these companies.
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which Pfizer is one). 152 At the least, this partial picture is not consis-
tent with an image of CAP taxpayers as the least aggressive lot. For
its part, the Service has explicitly indicated that even taxpayers that
use tax shelters are welcome to participate in CAP. 153 Tax shelters are
highly engineered tax transactions designed to reduce taxes in a man-
ner not intended by Congress. 154 They are widely deemed to be abu-
sive and designed to subvert the tax system. 155 The Service's
invitation to taxpayers engaged in tax shelters into the program indi-
cates a high water mark for potentially aggressive taxpayer behavior
becoming a part of CAP. The Service has lived up to its word on this
invitation, as taxpayers have boasted about their participation in CAP
even while litigating against the government regarding contentious tax
shelter transactions. 156 The resulting, hazy picture of the types of tax-
payers participating in CAP undermines the notion that only taxpay-
ers seeking to pay the "correct" amount of tax, whatever that may be,
will use CAP. We simply do not have enough information to know
who uses CAP and how it is being used.
What makes this situation more problematic is that, regardless of
the taxpaying disposition that CAP taxpayers start with, CAP itself
creates incentives to leverage a norm of reciprocity over time to the
advantage of taxpayers, and without the benefit of public oversight.
While the tax compliance literature has extensively considered how
reciprocity can be used to garner compliance from taxpayers, 157 it has
not considered how taxpayers may use reciprocity to garner conces-
sions from the Service. This underexamined aspect of reciprocity
nonetheless has a clear role to play in responsive tax administration
relationships, where taxpayers and the Service work closely together,
as in CAP. Indeed, in Australia, after the ATO remodeled its tax ad-
152 See id. at 381 tbl.1. As calculated by Avi-Yonah and Lahav, the 100 largest U.S.
companies (which includes Pfizer) had an aggregate effective tax rate of 24% in 2010.
However, significantly, Avi-Yonah and Lahav calculate aggregate effective tax rate based
on current income tax, rather than current income tax plus changes in deferred tax. Id. at
382. Nonetheless, Pfizer's effective tax rate, as listed in its 10-K, was also substantially
lower in 2009 and 2008 than the aggregate effective tax rate calculated by Avi-Yonah and
Lahav for those years. For 2008 and 2009, Pfizer indicates its effective tax rate was 17%
and 20.3%, whereas Avi-Yonah and Lahav calculate the aggregate effective tax rate as
being 56% and 30% for such years, respectively. Pfizer Inc., note 150, at 36; Avi-Yonah &
Lahav, note 151, at 381 tbl.1.
153 Elliott, note 96.
154 Osofsky, note 137, at 511.
155 For the foundational work on corporate tax shelters, see Joseph Bankman, The New
Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775 (June 21, 1999); see also David A.
Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 215 (2002) (examining the com-
plete disutility of tax shelters).
156 Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: An Ad for the CAP Program (Dec. 15, 2009),
2009 TNT 239-3, Dec. 16, 2009, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
157 See text accompanying notes 63-67.
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ministration around responsive regulation, auditors reported that it
was difficult to take a hard line against taxpayers, feeling that doing so
would be like "dobbing in a mate. ' 158 The concern is that taxpayers
would leverage the cooperative ethos of the CAP program to garner
advantages unavailable in the traditional audit process, thereby reduc-
ing taxpayer compliance in a manner nonetheless sanctioned by the
Service. 159 This possibility is especially valuable to large, corporate
taxpayers that otherwise would certainly be subject to traditional au-
dit. CAP may allow them to manipulate the program's reciprocity
norms to obtain desirable (but arguably inappropriate) results. 160
While reciprocity may be a persistent (and, some would argue,
therefore unobjectionable) feature of many interactions between the
Service and taxpayers,1 61 the tendency toward Service reciprocity is
particularly pernicious in the context of CAP. In CAP, the complete
veil of secrecy over negotiated outcomes leaves the Service altogether
unobserved by the public, leading to the real possibility of capture.
While, even in traditional audits, the public does not have direct ac-
cess to the negotiation between taxpayers and the IRS, its publication
of statistics regarding yields from audit nonetheless serves as a check
on the agreements reached. Granted, the public cannot easily evalu-
ate the outcomes of a particular company's audit from the general
audit statistics that the IRS publishes regarding large business admin-
istration. The fact that particular audits will be included in these gen-
eral statistics, however, likely serves as a reminder to auditors of the
inherent goal of producing revenue from audit. Moreover, at the in-
158 Job & Honaker, note 52, at 121.
159 Another example from Australia reveals sophisticated taxpayers' awareness of the
power of reciprocity to get advantageous results. Ernst & Young Australia has recently
advised taxpayers that they should consider "engaging with the ATO at an early stage"
because the "ATO is likely to favourably view taxpayers who commence action with them
early on." Craig Jackson, Managing the ATO's perception of You in the New Tax Risk
Differentiation Framework World Presentation 10 (2012) (paper prepared for Tax Inst.
Managing Tax Audits Meeting, Feb. 23, 2012). Along the same lines, "having an open
relationship with the ATO will allow taxpayers to couch the relevant transactions in the
best possible light, which in turn may reduce the Commissioner's inclination to review the
transaction further." Id. at 22.
160 Indeed, in response to the Service's recent announcements that it hopes to shift re-
sources away from the largest corporate taxpayers, rumors began to circulate of taxpayers
planning to drop out of CAP, because of their belief that they would be "left alone" by the
Service outside of the program. Amy S. Elliott, IRS Will Still Audit Large Corporate Tax-
payers Despite Resource Shift (Apr. 18, 2012), 2012 TNT 76-1, Apr. 19, 2012, available in
LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. For these taxpayers, use of CAP presumably was not simply a
means of getting certainty, as is often claimed, but rather a perceived means of getting a
better outcome than that available in the traditional audit system.
161 For example, even in the context of traditional tax audits, large business taxpayers
often work with the same auditors for an extensive period of time, leading to the possibility
of relationship building and the reciprocity that accompanies such relationships.
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ternal level, the generation of the statistics creates a salient means of
checking agents' agreements with particular companies to ensure they
are not too taxpayer favorable. In contrast, since all tax liabilities are
negotiated with taxpayers prior to return filing in CAP, the expecta-
tion is that there will be no yield from audit of CAP taxpayers.
Indeed, recent comments by Steven Miller, IRS Deputy Commis-
sioner, Service and Enforcement, highlight how the Service celebrates
"no change" in tax liability with CAP taxpayers, in direct contrast with
its evaluation method in all other contexts.162 Regarding a high "no
change" rate from CAP taxpayers, Miller advised, "Let's celebrate the
no change number. In other areas I am responsible for, a high no
change rate means we either failed to select the right taxpayer or we
missed or mishandled issues. Here, we applaud the rate-now we
need to lessen the burden on both taxpayer and the IRS to get to this
result. ' 163 Miller's comments illustrate how CAP layers on top of an
internal assumption that taxpayers are compliant, an external evalua-
tion system that does not second guess this assumption. Essentially,
CAP and responsive tax administration take tendencies toward inap-
propriate regulator concessions that admittedly exist in any close reg-
ulator-regulatee relationship and make them more extreme, while also
hiding them deeper from public view.164
The architects of responsive regulation understood well how gov-
ernment-regulatee partnerships can result in capture and offered
tripartism as the solution. 165 Unfortunately, as Ayres and Braithwaite
note, large business tax enforcement is the "difficult case" in which it
is hard to imagine an appropriate public interest group that could be
at the negotiating table as a watchdog. 166 Ayres and Braithwaite attri-
bute this difficulty to the "peculiar" way that tax laws "are brought
into existence by the state to serve the needs of the state rather than
in response to clamoring from external interests.' 67 While not con-
sidered by Ayres and Braithwaite, extensive privacy laws regarding
taxpayer information also present serious, practical problems with us-
ing public interest groups in the tax context. 68
162 Steven T. Miller, IRS Deputy Comm'r, Serv. & Enforcement, Remarks Before the
Tax Exec. Inst., Mid-Year Conference (Mar. 26, 2012), at 2, available at http://services.
taxanalysts.com/taxbase/eps-pdf2l2.nsfDocNoLookup/7336/$FILE/2012-7336-1.pdf.
163 Id.
164 Clearly, establishing good working relationships with taxpayers helps tax administra-
tion to some extent. The argument here, however, is that CAP and responsive tax adminis-
tration threaten to swing the pendulum too far toward cooperativeness and reciprocity,
without adequate checks and monitoring.
165 See text accompanying notes 45-47 for a description of tripartism.
166 Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1, at 59.
167 Id.
168 For further discussion of taxpayer privacy, see text accompanying notes 267-68.
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Nonetheless, especially because of these difficulties, the need for
oversight remains strong. Given the secrecy that shrouds agreements
reached with taxpayers, the IRS faces one-sided pressure from taxpay-
ers for greater leniency, inappropriately stacking the deck in the tax-
payers' favor. Taxpayers of course have not made any public
announcement regarding the Service being too lenient in reaching tax
liability negotiations in CAP. When taxpayers believe that the Service
has not been lenient enough, however, they are free to, and have, indi-
cated as much.169 This one-sided press, on top of lack of public insight
into the process, creates pressure to settle to the satisfaction of tax-
payers, thereby threatening to undermine the integrity of the pro-
cess. 170 Indeed, claims regarding CAP's success are often framed in
terms of its popularity with taxpayers, 171 perpetuating pressure on the
IRS and individual CAP agents to keep CAP popular.
Some might say that perhaps this result is not objectionable. Possi-
bly taxpayers cooperating with the IRS, thereby potentially reducing
use of Service resources, should be entitled to a slightly better tax
deal. The response is simply: perhaps. We do not know whether
CAP taxpayers are actually providing enhanced cooperation that
would merit a better deal. More generally, we just do not know what
is happening in CAP, even as more and more of the large business tax
base transitions to the program. As indicated in this Part, neither
faith in the transformative powers of responsive tax administration,
nor faith in the type of taxpayer using CAP, justifies speculation that
the program increases, rather than decreases, compliance. Monitoring
and evaluation, both absent at present, remain essential.
IV. LACK OF PENALTIES AND THE TEST-DRIVE EFFECT
The next problem with CAP is that the IRS has focused extensively
on persuasion and cooperation as a means of garnering taxpayer com-
pliance, overshadowing responsive tax administration's dual emphasis
169 See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: The Future of the CAP Program, 126 Tax
Notes 1458, 1458 (Mar. 22, 2010) (practitioner complaints about the Service exam team
"digging into issues that may not be necessary"); Amy S. Elliott, Areas of Tension in IRS's
CAP Program May Cause Growing Pains (Jan. 19, 2011), 2011 TNT 13-1, Jan. 20, 2011,
available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (highlighting taxpayer satisfaction as means of deter-
mining success of program and quoting a vice president in charge of a CAP taxpayer com-
plaining about the Service's treatment of particular issues); see also Nolan & Ng, note 57,
at 1056 (emphasizing that continuing taxpayer participation in the program is a good mea-
sure of CAP's success).
170 In a similar context, Service auditors have complained about how pressure to shorten
the time period for case closures of large business audits forced auditors to assess a fraction
of the taxes owed, resulting in billions of dollars of lost tax revenue annually. David Cay
Johnston, Agents Say Fast Audits Hurt I.R.S., N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2007, at Cl.
171 See, e.g., Nolan & Ng, note 57, at 1056.
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on punitiveness. In particular, CAP lacks meaningful penalties for
failure to disclose because of faith in the program's ability to ensure
transparency. Responsive regulation, however, counsels that the
threat of punishment is necessary to ensure compliance. More troub-
lesome, the lack of meaningful failure-to-disclose penalties creates a
test-drive effect. Taxpayers can use CAP as an opportunity to test-
drive the Service's ability to detect tax issues. CAP taxpayers can
then use the information gleaned to decide whether or not they have
to disclose a particular tax issue. This test-drive threatens to under-
mine general disclosure rules developed in recent years. This Part ex-
amines this problem and its consequences.
Outside the CAP context, an elaborate set of disclosure rules ap-
plies, along with significant penalties for failure to disclose. These
rules have played a crucial role in reducing taxpayers' reliance on the
audit lottery to hide questionable tax positions. While business tax-
payers likely take into account many different factors when making
tax compliance decisions, 172 a key factor affecting tax compliance his-
torically has been the likelihood that the Service will detect a particu-
lar position on audit ("the audit lottery"). An entire market of
corporate tax shelters developed around the audit lottery, 173 and the
same logic applies to less egregious tax planning. In determining
whether to undertake tax planning, taxpayers may evaluate not only
the merits of a tax issue, but also the likelihood the Service will find it.
The IRS and Treasury have turned in recent years to a system of
disclosure requirements and penalties to address this compliance chal-
lenge. They put into place a set of regulations aimed at tax shelters,
which contain an extensive set of reporting rules. They require every
taxpayer participating in a "reportable transaction"'174 to file a disclo-
172 See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 Harv. J. on Legis.
111, 131-38 (2009).
173 See, e.g., Bankman, note 155, at 1782, 1784 (discussing importance of the audit lot-
tery in the tax shelter market); Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Battle, in The Crisis in
Tax Administration 9, 15 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (describing difficulty
the IRS faces in finding tax shelters); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Enforcement for Gainers:
High Penalties or Strict Disclosure Rules, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 55, 56 (2009) (noting
that "[tjraditionally, a major attraction of tax shelters (footnote omitted) to garners was the
opportunity to play the audit lottery.").
174 "Reportable transactions" currently include "listed transactions," "confidential
transactions," "transactions with contractual protection," "loss transactions," and "transac-
tions of interest." Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1). Listed transactions are transactions that are "the
same as or substantially similar to" transactions that the Service has "determined to be a
tax avoidance transaction" and has so indicated in the form of public guidance. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(2). Confidential transactions are transactions "offered to a taxpayer under
conditions of confidentiality and for which the taxpayer has paid an advisor a minimum
fee" of $250,000, in the case of a corporation, or $50,000 in most other cases. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(3). Transactions with contractual protection are transactions "for which the
taxpayer or a related party ... has the right to a full or partial refund of fees ... if all or
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sure statement, which must be attached to the taxpayer's tax return
and sent to the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis.175 The disclosure state-
ment must "describe the expected tax treatment and all potential tax
benefits expected to result for the transaction" and "identify and de-
scribe the transaction in sufficient detail for the IRS to be able to un-
derstand the tax structure of the reportable transaction .... "176
Failure to report reportable transactions results in penalties. 177 The
new, strict liability penalty for understatements attributable to trans-
actions lacking economic substance 178 also encourages disclosure of
tax shelters, because the penalty increases from 20% to 40% of the
underpayment for undisclosed transactions.179
The Service appears to have been vigilant in pursuing these penal-
ties. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
(TIGTA) conducted a study in 2010 regarding the Service's applica-
tion of one, particular failure-to-disclose penalty, the § 6707A pen-
alty. 180 TIGTA found that the IRS asserted large penalties, even
when the penalty exceeded the understated tax liability. 181 Although
by far most of these penalties were assessed against small businesses
that fell outside of LB&I's jurisdiction, 182 the important point for
part of the intended tax consequences from the transaction are not sustained." Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(4). Loss transactions are transactions in which the taxpayer claims a loss
exceeding certain, specified thresholds. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5). Transactions of interest are
transactions that are the "same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transac-
tions that the IRS has identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance
as a transaction of interest." Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(6).
175 Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(d), (e).
176 Reg. § 1.6011-4(d).
177 Under § 6707A, failure to disclose a reportable transaction results in a penalty of
75% of the decrease in tax as a result of the transaction, not to exceed $200,000 in the case
of listed transactions or $50,000 in the case of other reportable transactions. IRC
§ 6707A(b). The penalty is limited to $100,000 for listed transactions and $10,000 for other
reportable transactions in the case of natural persons. Id. Under § 6662A, understate-
ments of tax attributable to certain undisclosed reportable transactions result in a penalty
equal to 30% of the understatement. IRC §§ 6662A(a), (c). Additional, negative conse-
quences also result from failure to disclose reportable transactions, including limitations on
interest abatement and an extension of the statute of limitations on assessment. IRC
§§ 6404(g), 6501(c)(10).
178 IRC § 7701(o).
179 IRC § 6662(i). Additionally, the Code now requires "material advisors with respect
to any reportable transaction" to file a disclosure statement with the Service identifying
and describing the transaction and any tax benefits that may result from the transaction.
IRC § 6111(a). Failure to comply with these requirements results in a penalty of $50,000,
or, in the case of listed transactions, the greater of $200,000 or 50% of the gross income
derived by the material advisor from the transaction. IRC § 6707(b). Other penalties also
apply. See IRC §§ 6112, 6708.
180 Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Penalty Cases for Failure to Disclose Re-
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LB&I taxpayers was that the Service, at least in the studied period,
appeared to be quite willing to assess penalties when taxpayers did not
meet the requirements.1 8 3 TIGTA concluded that "[t]he penalty re-
sulted in substantially higher disclosure rates to the IRS, which helped
to identify and shut down many abusive transactions.' 1 84
The Service has recently tried to expand this regime with the pro-
mulgation of disclosure rules for uncertain tax positions, under Sched-
ule UTP, which places broad requirements on LB&I taxpayers to
reveal their uncertain tax issues. 8 5 While failure to comply with
Schedule UTP currently does not result in a penalty other than poten-
tial penalties for failure to comply with filing requirements, the Ser-
vice has warned that it may develop penalties to respond to significant
Schedule UTP noncompliance.1 8 6 As a result, Schedule UTP is an-
other example of the signifiant development of disclosure rules and
penalties intended to limit the lure of the audit lottery in the tradi-
tional audit regime.
The contrast between this elaborate disclosure regime and CAP is
stark. The fundamental premise of CAP is that taxpayers will be
transparent with the Service regarding all material issues, in exchange
for certainty from the Service.18 7 Unlike in the tax return filing con-
text (in which the above described disclosure rules and failure to dis-
close penalties operate robustly), CAP has no meaningful way to
ensure transparency, other than faith in the power of CAP to create it.
As discussed in further detail below (with respect to the test-drive
effect), the traditional failure-to-disclose penalties do apply to CAP
taxpayers when they ultimately file their tax returns. The prefiling
nature of CAP, however, means that these failure-to-disclose penalties
are much less meaningful for CAP taxpayers than for non-CAP tax-
payers. Moreover, CAP contains no formal penalties of its own either
to make up for this deficit or to ensure that CAP taxpayers meet the
fundamental transparency expectations on which the program is
predicated.
What the Service does obtain from CAP taxpayers is an MOU be-
tween the Service and each CAP taxpayer, which ostensibly requires
183 Id.
184 Id. But see note 216 for some qualifications regarding the importance of the disclo-
sure rules.
185 See Instructions for Schedule UTP (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/news-
room/2010 instructions-for-schutp.pdf.
186 Jeremiah Coder, Year in Review: UTP Reporting Regime Rattles Corporate Tax
Community (Dec. 13, 2010), 2011 TNT 1-7, Jan. 3, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File.
187 See Thomas Jaworski, LMSB Commissioner Sees Benefits to Tiered Enforcement
System, Tax Return Technology (Nov. 7, 2007), 2007 TNT 217-5, Nov. 8, 2007, available in
LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
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that taxpayers "make open, comprehensive, and contemporaneous
disclosures of [their] completed business transactions" and all material
items. 188 Material items include any item that would require a reserve
for financial statement purposes' 89 and any item that meets a materi-
ality dollar threshold established by the taxpayer and Service. 190
The Service's seemingly strongest lever to ensure transparency is
the requirement that the taxpayer disclose any issues that would re-
quire a financial statement reserve. CAP taxpayers must submit certi-
fied, audited financial statements to the Service on a quarterly
basis.19' FASB Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in
Income Taxes (FIN 48), governs when and how companies must cre-
ate reserves for uncertain tax benefits on their financial statements. 92
Under FIN 48, a tax benefit must meet two thresholds in order for a
taxpayer to be able to recognize the benefit for financial statement
purposes. 93 First, there must be a "more likely than not" chance that
the position would be sustained, based on its substantive merits.194
Second, the taxpayer can only recognize the amount of benefit for
which there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the Service and the
taxpayer would settle on audit.' 95 If a taxpayer took a position on its
tax return that does not meet this two-step recognition test, it must
place a reserve on its financial statements for the tax benefit. As a
result, when taxpayers reveal their financial reserves, they are, at least
in theory, revealing valuable information about their questionable tax
positions.
Moreover, requiring taxpayers to reveal their potential reserves for
financial statement purposes leverages the potency of the financial re-
porting regime. Audited financial statements require the cooperation
of outside auditors, who must approve the company's financial state-
ments, including the reserves for uncertain tax benefits. 96 Public
companies face potentially grave consequences for concealing transac-
tions from their auditors, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX").97
CEOs and CFOs of public companies must certify the company's
188 Compliance Assurance Process (The CAP), Memorandum of Understanding, http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/capmou-final.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2012), at 2.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 3.
191 I.R.M. 4.51.8.4 (2012).
192 FASB Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (No. 281-
B) (June 2006), at 1.
193 See id. at 3.
194 Id. at 2.
195 Id. at 3.
196 See Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in
the Post-SOX Environment, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 43, 49-50 (2007) (describing auditor's role).
197 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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quarterly financial reports and face criminal penalties for knowingly
or willfully certifying a report that does not fairly present, in all mate-
rial respects, the financial condition, results, and operations of the
company. 198 Additionally, if an external auditor discovers that any
information has not been revealed, the auditor may declare that the
company has a tax-related "material weakness," resulting in adverse
reputational consequences to the company, as well as potentially more
severe consequences to the parties involved. 199
This means of ensuring transparency in CAP is not quite as valuable
as might appear at first glance. As an initial matter, the Service re-
quires this information from large business taxpayers in the traditional
audit regime. Under Schedule UTP, large business taxpayers already
must reveal their financial reserves for uncertain tax positions. As a
result, requiring taxpayers to reveal their reserves in CAP does not
provide the Service assurance of transparency above and beyond what
large business taxpayers may supply outside of CAP. Additionally,
CAP is available to private companies, as well as public companies.2'°
While the CAP rules require private companies to provide audited
financial statements to the Service on a quarterly basis, this require-
ment is not as meaningful. Most of the SOX provisions apply to pub-
lic, not private companies. 20 As a result, private companies do not
face have the same impetus to interact transparently with their audi-
tors. Financial reserves from these companies, therefore, are less val-
uable in ensuring transparency. Finally, despite the increasingly
conventional wisdom to the contrary,202 for both private and public
companies, audited financial statements are not a transparency pan-
acea. Auditors have significant discretion in determining whether a
reserve is required for a questionable tax position. As objective as the
FIN 48 standards sound, they ultimately rely on an auditor's opinion
198 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
199 See Morse, note 5, at 978-79, for a good description of the negative consequences
flowing from a "material weakness," including, in many cases, loss of employment for the
company's tax director.
200 I.R.M. 4.51.8 (2012).
201 Limited exceptions apply. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 802(a), 116 Stat. 745, 801, amended provisions of 18 U.S.C. dealing with securities or
commodities fraud, the destruction, falsification, and alteration of auditing documents,
bankruptcy materials, and matters subject to a federal investigations, as well as a
whistleblower protection provision. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1520, 1514A, 1348. Title IX, the
White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, created two new statutory provi-
sions: (1) a mail fraud attempt and conspiracy provision and (2) the creation of a criminal
provision forcing the chief executive officer or the chief financial officer to certify all peri-
odic financial statements. This title also enhanced the criminal provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. § 904, 805.
202 See, e.g., Wells, note 5, at 660 (2010) (stating that "the combined effect of the enact-
ment of SOX and the issuance of FIN 48 has brought transparency and rigorous documen-
tation with respect to a company's uncertain tax positions").
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regarding the likelihood of any number of complicated tax positions
being sustained. Empirical evidence reveals that auditors have exhib-
ited widely divergent reserve practices regarding identical, or nearly
identical, tax issues. 20 3 Requiring CAP companies to reveal financial
statement reserves, then, does not serve as a unique, or necessarily
successful, means of ensuring transparency as to all material tax issues
in CAP.2°4
Significantly, the IRS applies no penalty for failure to meet the par-
ticular transparency requirements and expectations in CAP. The only
formal downside a company faces is that, if a taxpayer does not abide
by the spirit of CAP, the Service can remove the taxpayer from the
program.20 5 For some taxpayers, this possibility could serve as a sig-
nificant reason to maintain transparency in CAP. Taxpayers that
highly value CAP may fear ejection and therefore provide the Service
the required transparency. Even these taxpayers, however, should not
greatly fear this outcome. The Service has gone out of its way to indi-
cate that taxpayers with problematic relationships with the Service are
"just still taxpayers" that could very well be eligible for participation
in CAP in the future.206 An ejected company, then, potentially could
mend its ways, or at least appear to do so, and regain entry into the
program. For taxpayers that are in CAP simply to try to get a better
outcome through CAP than a traditional audit, being returned to the
traditional audit regime with no further penalty is no penalty at all,
compared to the alternative of just being in the traditional audit re-
gime. Nonetheless, companies that fail to disclose transparently in
CAP may face the more informal sanction of red-flagging themselves
for audit in future years, should the Service detect their lack of trans-
parency. As an initial matter, though, the Service would have to find a
taxpayer's undisclosed transactions or issues in order for this sanction
to apply-never an easy task. This informal sanction is also uncertain,
at best. Indeed, Lisa De Simone, Richard Sansing, and Jeri Seidman
203 See De Simone et al., note 5; see also Amy S. Elliott, Wilkins Describes Uncertain
Tax Positions Under New Requirements (Mar. 10, 2010), 2010 TNT 47-1, Mar. 11, 2010,
available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (in which IRS Chief Counsel Wilkins acknowledged
that two identical companies could come to different conclusions regarding reserves for
financial statement purposes and that their differing conclusions would not be the Service's
business).
204 See Yuni Yan, Minimizing Potential Privilege Implications Caused by Schedule UTP,
3 Colum. J. Tax L. Tax Matters 17, 19 (2012) (explaining, in discussing Schedule UTP, that
taxpayers "will likely try to keep such disclosures as limited and vague as possible" and
discussing some strategies for doing so, including "simply claim[ing] that the chance of
settling any position that passes the 'more likely than not' test is always more than 50%.").
205 I.R.M. 4.51.8.7 (2012).
206 Amy S. Elliott, Tiered Issues, Contentious Audits Not a Bar to CAP Acceptance,
Says IRS Official (Apr. 13, 2011), 2011 TNT 71-2, Apr. 13, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax
Analysts File.
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collected anecdotal evidence from IRS agents indicating both that
CAP firms have been less than transparent and that the Service had
not even asked these firms to leave the program, much less flagged
them for additional review.207 The bottom line is that, while taxpayers
may have reason to fear some contingent, informal consequences as a
result of failure to meet CAP's particular transparency requirement,
the program remains particularly weak on formal penalties. While pu-
nitive measures need not be in the regulatory foreground to ensure
compliance,20 8 they play little to no role in ensuring transparency in
CAP.
As an initial matter, the lack of any meaningful punitive stick in the
background to ensure transparency in the foreground exemplifies U.S.
large business tax administration's failure to fully implement respon-
sive regulation. Ayres and Braithwaite repeatedly recognize the im-
portance of punitive measures in the regulatory scheme. 20 9 Again and
again, Ayres and Braithwaite emphasize that regulators must apply
penalties for failure to comply.210 Most vividly, Ayres and Braithwaite
describe a dog as a model regulator.211 A dog's "[f]riendliness can
turn to a warning bark, then a more menacing growl," escalating until
the threat of a "sudden rush. '212 By contrast, in CAP, the Service has
no bark and no bite. As a result, the program is in danger of becom-
ing a "bland invocatio[n] of 'voluntary compliance"' rather than "self-
regulation in a system of external and internal accountability," as en-
visioned by responsive regulation's architects. 213 This weakness, of
course, would tend to compound any natural tendencies of responsive
tax administration to create inappropriately taxpayer favorable
results.
Essentially, CAP threatens to provide large businesses with legiti-
macy, giving them a stamp of approval regarding their tax compli-
207 De Simone et al., note 5, at 3. The authors conclude that "even when the taxpayer
does not always live up to its pledge to disclose all uncertain tax positions, the program can
still reduce total expected tax compliance costs incurred by the taxpayer and the revenue
authority." Id. at 5. Their model, in this regard, is discussed further at text accompanying
notes 225-26
208 Braithwaite, note 7, at 198.
209 Ayres & Braithwaite, note 1, at 37-38.
210 See, e.g., id. at 26, 33-36, 40, 44, 52-53, 161.
211 Id. at 44.
212 Id.
213 Estlund, note 29, at 142; see also Karkkainen, note 24, at 488-89 ("One of the persis-
tent and pervasive misconceptions about New Governance is that it is wholly reliant on
'soft law' mechanisms, and therefore ultimately dependent on the good intentions and vol-
untary actions of parties who heretofore have shown little inclination toward acting in the
desired directions.").
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ance, 214 while failing to actually ensure the transparency necessary to
guarantee compliance. 215 The unjustified faith in the program to yield
transparency has overshadowed the need for penalties to ensure
transparency.
Even more problematic, CAP threatens to undermine the broader
failure-to-disclose penalties that operate in the general return filing
context. While some tax scholars have reasonably questioned the ef-
fectiveness of these disclosure rules as currently administered 216 and
have examined other important factors for large business tax plan-
ning,217 the disclosure rules undoubtedly have increased the costs of
engaging in questionable tax planning and reporting. As a result, of-
fering taxpayers a way out of the otherwise robust disclosure rules
through CAP could have broad, deleterious effects on the tax compli-
ance system.
To be sure, CAP taxpayers are technically still subject to the tradi-
tional disclosure rules and failure-to-disclose penalties when they ulti-
mately file their tax returns. However, the prefiling nature of CAP
creates a test-drive effect that greatly reduces their potency for CAP
taxpayers. Taxpayers can use CAP as a chance to determine what the
Service can detect, without the threat of failure-to-disclose penalties.
Taxpayers in CAP can comply, or even over-comply, with the Ser-
vice's information requests, all the while failing to disclose a particular
questionable tax position. Companies in CAP can provide the Service
214 See Cliff Jernigan, Corporate Tax Audit Survival, A View of the IRS Through Corpo-
rate Insider Eyes (2005). Jernigan suggests that CAP participation could be used to signal a
corporation's high level of compliance. ("Company CEOs will want their companies in the
CAP program because it, like the Malcolm Baldrige Award, will signify a company known
for its honesty and fair dealing.") Id. at 77.
215 Gregory Rawlings has claimed that responsive tax administration has produced a
similar effect in the context of international tax competition. Gregory Rawlings, Taxes and
Transnational Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sover-
eignty, 29 Law & Pol'y 51, 51-52 (2007).
216 As an initial matter, tax shelters can manufacture enormous tax losses, resulting in
economic gains of hundreds of millions of dollars. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v.
United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (tax shelter in which Black and Decker claimed
a $560 million capital loss). The value of not disclosing the transaction and thereby greatly
decreasing the likelihood of detection may outweigh the additional couple hundred thou-
sand dollars of potential penalty, should the IRS detect the transaction. See Michael L.
Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Re-
ply to Professor Weisbach, 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 357-59 (2007) (discussing weaknesses of
disclosure approach). Moreover, companies can engage in "overdisclosure" tactics so as to
technically abide by the disclosure rules while still making detection unlikely. See gener-
ally Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 1629 (2009).
217 For example, Susan Cleary Morse has argued that Sarbanes-Oxley (discussed in
more detail in text accompanying notes 196-99) has helped foster a new "compliance
norm" among large corporations that transcends a simple economic deterrence model.
Morse, note 5, at 1012.
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voluminous information regarding their tax situations in order to hide
questionable issues. 218 Taxpayers can provide even more voluminous
records in CAP.219 As a result, taxpayers may bury the Service with
information, and perhaps evade the Service's detection of particular,
questionable positions.
While this opportunity also exists in traditional audits, the problem
becomes more pernicious in CAP because the program eliminates the
downside from engaging in this behavior. CAP taxpayers can wait to
see what the Service can find in CAP, without facing failure-to-dis-
close penalties, because they do not apply until return filing.220 If the
Service does find either an undisclosed tax shelter or questionable is-
sue in CAP, then the taxpayer may (but will not necessarily) be dis-
missed from the program and returned to the traditional audit regime.
At that time, however, the taxpayer can then disclose the issue on its
tax return and thereby avoid the failure-to-disclose penalties that oth-
erwise would be applicable. Importantly, if the IRS cannot detect the
issue in CAP, then the taxpayer can file its tax return without disclos-
ing the issue, with a fair amount of confidence that the Service cannot
find it. The taxpayer therefore may not only evade the failure-to-dis-
218 Corporate tax returns themselves can run tens of thousands of pages. See, e.g., Press
Release, IRS, IRS e-file Moves Forward; Successfully Executes Electronic Filing of Na-
tion's Largest Tax Return, (May 31, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-e-file-
Moves-Forward;-Successfully-Executes-Electronic-Filing-of-Nation's-Largest-Tax-Return
(describing the electronic filing of General Electric's tax return, which, on paper, would
have been approximately 24,000 pages long).
219 At the least, CAP taxpayers must supply the Service with "[a]n industry overview;
[c]urrent organizational charts reflecting all related entities and the flow of relevant infor-
mation involving those entities; [f]inancial performance information; [i]nformation on any
anticipated significant events that will affect the reporting for the tax year; and [n]ecessary
resources for disclosure of requested information" in addition to "tax schedules and com-
putations for all rollover and recurring adjustments from any previously examined and
closed tax period(s) that impact the CAP year return, including the impact of any closing
agreements or Appeals settlements," "notice and documentation of any subsequent resolu-
tion(s) of items or issues in prior exam cycles within 15 business days of the agreed deter-
mination(s)" and responses to any Service information document requests. I.R.M. 4.51.8
(2012).
220 In another context, researchers have developed evidence regarding the value to tax-
payers of being able to see what the tax agency can see. Norman Gemmell and Marisa
Ratto examined the impact of audits on U.K. taxpayers. While they predictably found that
taxpayers deemed to be "noncompliant" (as determined by positive yield from audit) in-
creased their subsequent compliance, they importantly found that taxpayers deemed to be
"compliant" (as determined by zero yield from audit) reduced their subsequent compli-
ance. This effect was the greatest for the largest business group in their study (which was
comprised of medium sized businesses). Part of their explanation for the subsequent re-
duction in compliance by taxpayers determined to be "compliant" was that these taxpayers
gained inside information about the tax agency's detection capacity and therefore adjusted
their expectation of detection on audit downward. Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto,
Behavioral Responses to Taxpayer Audits: Evidence from Random Taxpayer Inquiries, 65
Nat'l Tax J. 33 (2012).
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close penalties and the risk of such penalties, but also obtain the tax-
payer's desirable tax outcome on a questionable, or even highly
unlikely, tax position.
One counterweight to the test-drive effect is that being in CAP
means that the taxpayer is voluntarily submitting to a general audit.
Indeed, taxpayers face two different considerations when evaluating
the likelihood that a particular tax position will be audited. The first is
whether the taxpayer will be audited at all. The second is whether, if
the Service audits the taxpayer, the Service will audit the particular
tax issue in question. As a result, volunteering to be in CAP removes
one of the major ways that a taxpayer can evade detection on a partic-
ular issue, avoiding audit review entirely.
Some taxpayers, however, are all but assured to be audited as a
general matter. LB&I is responsible for all business taxpayers with
assets greater than $10 million. 221 Within LB&I, there are two catego-
ries of cases: Coordinated Industry Cases (CIC) and Industry Cases
(IC). A number of factors determine which taxpayers fall into which
category, including the taxpayer's size and the complexity of the tax-
payer's tax situation. CIC taxpayers are large, complex taxpayers222
that are audited on an essentially constant basis. 223 As a result, CIC
taxpayers stand to gain from the test-drive effect, and they do not lose
something they never had-the possibility of avoiding audit entirely.
Even for IC taxpayers, the test-drive effect may outweigh losing the
possibility of avoiding audit entirely. While the probability of general
audit goes up if the taxpayer decides to partake in CAP, the likelihood
of the failure-to-disclose penalty goes down.2 24 Whether an IC tax-
payer is better or worse off in CAP, then, depends on the taxpayer's
possibility of audit outside of CAP, as compared to the decreased like-
lihood of failure-to-disclose penalties. This calculus will likely vary
between taxpayers. At the least, though, the lack of failure-to-disclose
penalties in CAP creates an incentive for CIC taxpayers and some IC
221 IRS, Large Business and International (LB&I) Division Directory, http://www.irs.
gov/Businesses/Large-Business-and-International-(LB&I)-Division-Directory (last visited
Oct. 24, 2012).
222 IRM 4.46.2.5 (2006).
223 IRM 4.46.2.4 (2009).
224 There would still be some possibility that the IRS could find the issue on the tax
return, even though it did not in the CAP context. If the taxpayer gets enough information
in CAP, this possibility should be small. If, however, the taxpayer obtains enough informa-
tion in CAP to know that the Service is likely to find the issue on the tax return, the
taxpayer could still disclose the issue on the tax return without facing a failure-to-disclose
penalty. If a taxpayer reports an issue on its return that was not agreed to by the Service in
CAP, the Service simply audits the issue in a traditional, post-filing review. IRM 4.51.8
(2012).
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taxpayers to subvert the disclosure regime, instead utilizing CAP as a
chance to see what the Service can see.
As a counterargument, De Simone, Sansing, and Seidman recently
have set forth an interesting model regarding enhanced relationship
tax compliance programs, like CAP, which questions, to some extent,
the need for failure-to-disclose penalties in the context of CAP. They
conclude that "a cooperative approach to resolving uncertain tax posi-
tions can be beneficial even if neither party can be punished for violat-
ing agreed upon terms of an enhanced relationship program. 2 25 The
underlying mechanism in their model is as follows: Taxpayers have
uncertain tax positions, which are either weak or strong. Without ad-
ditional guidance, the Service has to audit all uncertain tax positions.
Inside CAP, however, the IRS gains knowledge regarding whether po-
sitions are weak or strong. According to the model, taxpayers will
only disclose strong positions to the Service in CAP. As a result, the
Service can avoid auditing the disclosed positions. The Service can
focus on auditing only undisclosed positions, which are presumably
weak. If the Service's auditing capacity is strong enough, then taxpay-
ers in CAP will only claim strong positions. The process of disclosure
in CAP reduces the Service's auditing costs and provides higher yield
from audit.226
The argument, however, does not eliminate the problem of lack of
meaningful penalties for failure to be transparent in CAP. Crucially,
the Service needs to be able to find weak positions in order to chal-
lenge them. But the Service has indicated that one of its biggest com-
pliance challenges is identifying issues.227 Challenging weak positions
is how the IRS produces the most significant returns. Therefore, tax-
payers' disclosure of weak issues remains essential for IRS administra-
tion efforts. CAP systematically reduces taxpayers' incentives to
disclose weak positions, relative to the traditional compliance regime.
Whatever other benefits CAP may provide the Service, this systematic
weakening of taxpayers' incentives to disclose weak positions poses a
potentially significant problem for tax compliance, both inside and
outside of the program.
225 De Simone et al., note 5, at 5.
226 Id.
227 For example, in connection with the issuance of Schedule UTP, IRS Commissioner
Douglas Shulman stated that "today [the IRS] spend[s] up to 25 percent of [its] time in a
large corporate audit searching for issues rather than having a straightforward discussion
with the taxpayer about the issues. It would add efficiency to the process if [the IRS] had
access to more complete information earlier in the process regarding the nature and mate-
riality of a taxpayer's uncertain tax positions." Douglas H. Shulman, IRS Comm'r, Re-
marks to N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Tax'n Sec. (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/
Prepared-Remarks-of-IRS-Commissioner-Doug-Shulman-to-New-York-State-Bar-Associ-
ation-Taxation-Section-Annual-Meeting-in-New-York-City,-Jan.-26,-2010.
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V. SELF-SELECTION BrAs
The final problem with CAP is that it creates the potential for self-
selection bias. CAP creates self-selection bias by allowing taxpayers
within LB&I to elect into IRS review, thereby reducing the availabil-
ity of audit resources for non-CAP taxpayers. A strain of the tax com-
pliance literature, dovetailing with responsive tax administration,
emphasizes that providing taxpayers service (which is simply a partic-
ular form of persuasion) may be an important way to induce voluntary
compliance. As an initial matter, like the responsive tax administra-
tion empirical research generally, the research regarding service provi-
sion specifically, currently is indeterminate. More fundamentally,
allowing taxpayers to self-select into IRS review through CAP poten-
tially creates a significant dampening effect on the powerful indirect
revenue-raising capabilities of random audits. In a world with infinite
resources, the IRS could review all large business taxpayers, first
through provision of service, backed up with punitive measures for
any noncompliant taxpayers. In reality, though, the IRS faces very
limited resources, sharply curtailing the total number of large business
taxpayers it can review. In this reality, offering service by invitation to
all large business taxpayers threatens to undercut the important deter-
rence measure of random auditing. As a result, self-selection bias
serves as another example of how the implementation of responsive
tax administration in U.S. large business has overemphasized persua-
sion, to the detriment of important deterrence measures.
Prior to CAP's finalization in 2011, the Service chose which taxpay-
ers to invite into CAP. Upon finalization of the program, the Service
opened the program to all LB&I taxpayers by application. 228 As a
result, all CIC and IC taxpayers can now apply to enter CAP. The
Service has indicated that taxpayers will have various rights if their
application is denied. Specifically, taxpayers denied entry into CAP
may appeal the decision to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) of
LB&I.229 This appeal is meant to provide taxpayers a "fair hearing"
on the denial.230 The Service has intimated that CAP is available to
taxpayers open to working with the Service, even if they have previ-
ously'had a contentious relationship. 231 While the Service is maintain-
ing some gate-keeping role for entry into CAP through the application
process, opening CAP to all LB&I taxpayers by application means
that allocation of Service resources is now dictated in part by taxpayer
decisions. Taxpayers can now flag themselves for IRS review, rather
228 Trivedi & Elliott, note 23, at 11.
229 IRM 4.51.8 (2012).
230 Elliott, note 206.
231 Id.
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than the other way around, and, absent some significant reason for
denial, taxpayers will have a good chance of entry.
A major argument made in support of CAP is that it will allow the
IRS to move resources downstream within LB&I, thereby increasing
compliance. Currently, the roughly 700 CIC taxpayers in LB&I are
under continuous audit. 232 This means that the approximately 250,000
smaller, IC taxpayers within LB&I experience a much lower likeli-
hood of audit.233 In 2010, CIC taxpayers, which comprised less than
1% of LB&I,234 were allocated more than one-half of its audit re-
sources. 235 The theory is that if CAP reduces the audit cycle time for
CIC taxpayers, then the Service can use the saved resources to create
a greater presence among the IC taxpayers. 236 As expressed by the
Large & Mid-Size Business Subgroup of the IRS Advisory Council,
CAP should "result in the ability to reallocate resources to audit mid-
market taxpayers," and "[r]e-focusing resources to this basically un-
touched taxpayer base should pay dividends to the IRS by signifi-
cantly increasing taxpayer compliance. '237
If CAP does successfully reduce the use of resources for CIC audits
without reducing CIC taxpayers' compliance, then using CAP to shift
resources downstream to IC taxpayers seems unobjectionable. The
claim that CAP requires fewer IRS resources than a traditional audit,
while not shown definitively, seems likely to be true.238 As explained
earlier, however, whether CAP actually maintains (or increases) com-
pliance at the CIC level is currently unclear. 239 As a result, it is diffi-
cult to evaluate whether CAP effectively channels resources
232 Id.
233 IRS Advisory Council Public Meeting, Large & Mid-Size Business Subgroup Report
26 (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2005_irsac-public-meeting.
pdf; Elliott, note 206; see also Elliott, note 111 (in which the IRS Deputy Commissioner for
Services and Enforcement lamented this state of affairs and suggested that the IRS intends
to take action to downstream and reallocate its resources).
234 At the time, LB&I had a slightly different structure and was called the "Large and
Mid-Size Business Division" or "LMSB".
235 Pamela Olson, Announcement 2010-9: Can This Marriage Be Saved?, 51 Tax Mgmt.
Memorandum 227 (2010).
236 Jeremiah Coder, Global Economy Will Drive LMSB's Future, Maloy Says (Sept. 22,
2010), 2010 TNT 183-1, Sept. 22, 2010, available in LEXIS Tax Analysts File.
237 IRS, note 233, at 26.
238 Sam Young, IRS Refining Corporate Issues Program, Tax Enforcement, 119 Tax
Notes 805 (May 26, 2008) (in which then Commissioner of LMSB Victor Ng indicated that
LMSB examinations average around fourteen months, whereas CAP takes only around six
months). Unanswered questions include: (1) How does the IRS resource use during CAP
compare with resource use during a comparable period of time for a traditional audit? (2)
How many IRS resources are used to prepare a taxpayer to be eligible for CAP and to
what extent do these figures take into account the preparation stages?
239 See Part III.
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downstream from the CIC level without reducing compliance of CIC
taxpayers.
Even assuming that CAP does reduce resource use at the CIC level
without reducing CIC compliance, offering CAP by open application
across all LB&I taxpayers (including the large pool of IC taxpayers, as
the Service has recently done) is not necessarily the right tax compli-
ance decision. Rather, allowing IC taxpayers to elect into CAP
presents a serious self-selection bias problem. The Service faces per-
petual limitations on its resources. 240 To the extent that the Service
offers taxpayers that would not otherwise be chosen for audit the op-
portunity to engage in CAP, CAP reduces Service resources otherwise
available for audit based on the Service's selection criteria. 241 As a
result, if IC taxpayers electing into CAP dominate resources, the Ser-
vice may lose its ability to target IC taxpayers based on their compli-
ance profiles. The result may be that the Service expends its resources
on relatively compliant, conservative taxpayers forgoing revenue col-
lection from auditing more aggressive taxpayers.
While, as discussed in Part III, aggressive taxpayers may elect into
CAP for a variety of reasons, conservative taxpayers that are unlikely
to be audited may also elect into Service review, via CAP, for a num-
ber of reasons. First, these taxpayers may want to lower the reserves
they take for financial accounting purposes. They may believe that,
by participating in CAP, they can get the Service to agree that they
should succeed on tax positions, even though they could not convince
their external auditors of the same. As a result, by participating in
CAP, they can get an immediate financial statement benefit on a net
basis by reducing their reserves. Taxpayers widely cite management
of financial reserves as a reason to participate in CAP.242 While tax-
payers often emphasize that they simply want to gain greater accu-
racy, and not necessarily a reduction, in their financial statement
240 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service FY 2012 Budget Request: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Fin. Serv. & Gen. Gov't Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Nina E. Olson, Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate) (arguing that the IRS needs more
resources and discussing tension between resources for enforcement and service), available
at 2011 TNT 111-69, June 8, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
241 See, e.g., Dustin Stamper, High-Income Audits Lead Increases in IRS Enforcement
Numbers (Nov. 20, 2006), 2006 TNT 224-3, Nov. 21, 2006, available in LEXIS, Tax Ana-
lysts File (in which Service Commissioner Mark Everson explained that the dip in large
corporation audits was the result of a shift to CAP); U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
Financial Audit, IRS's Fiscal Years 2007 and 2006 Financial Statements 22 (2007), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08166.pdf (indicating, in Service Management Discus-
sion and Analysis, that CAP was a reason for shortfall in business audit coverage).
242 See, e.g., KPMG, Potential Benefits, Burdens for Taxpayers Participating in the IRS
Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) Program (2011), available at http://www.us.kpmg.
com/microsite/taxnewsflash/Corporate/2011/TNFCorpExecll_16.html.
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reserves,243 Beck and Lisowsky have shown that CAP participation
significantly reduces financial reserves, as compared to non-CAP
firms.244 Using CAP and reducing reserves, then, seem to go hand in
hand, and may serve as a significant motivation for CAP participa-
tion.245 Second, some taxpayers may have such conservative disposi-
tions that they would not take a questionable position for the
purposes of a tax return, if not for some reassurance that the Service
agreed with the position. These taxpayers may have much to gain, in
terms of reduced, actual tax liability, by getting the Service's assis-
tance in examining issues. Whatever the cause of taxpayers electing
into CAP, an essential feature of the program is that taxpayers them-
selves have a heavy hand in deciding how to allocate IRS examination
resources. This is a significant shift from the traditional audit process,
in which the IRS is the sole decider.2 46
The Service could reverse course should it find its resources inap-
propriately dominated by IC taxpayers.2 47 At least at present, how-
ever, the Service does not seem concerned about the inevitable
taxpayer allocation of IRS resources as a result of IC taxpayers elect-
ing into examination. Just the opposite. As previously indicated, the
Service has both celebrated CAP's finalization and expansion across
the LB&I taxpayer base and explained that it hopes to "expand [on
CAP's] success systemwide. ' 248 As a result, without a change in the
243 See, e.g., M. Catherine Cleaveland, Kathryn K. Epps & Cassie F. Bradley, Real-Time
Corporate Tax Audits and Their Impact on Financial Reporting, 80 CPA J. 46, 47 (2010).
244 Beck & Lisowsky, note 5, at 22-26.
245 Indeed, the Service has intimated that providing taxpayers certainty (which would
lower their reserves for financial reporting purposes) was one of the motivations for creat-
ing CAP. See Alison Bennett, TRAC Asserts "Historic Collapse in Audits"; Shott Says
Interpretation of Data Is Wrong, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 15, 2008, at G-10.
246 Cf. Raskolnikov, note 5, at 707-10. Raskolnikov's article set forth a novel, and im-
portant, tax compliance framework, in which taxpayers would sort themselves into either a
compliance regime or a deterrence regime. The compliance regime would be comprised of
programs, like CAP, that would provide guidance for taxpayers. The compliance regime
would also contain various features (like a pro-government presumption and mandatory
arbitration) designed to make the regime undesirable to aggressive taxpayers that are mo-
tivated by economic incentives to underpay their tax liability. Raskolnikov's imagined re-
gime, therefore, combines service provision (for example, through CAP) with negative
consequences for taking aggressive positions, in a manner that is absent from the current
provision of service through CAP.
247 There is some precedent for the IRS changing its guidance policy based on perceived
misallocation of its resources. In Rev. Proc. 2003-48, the Service announced that it would
no longer issue letter rulings regarding the business purpose requirement of § 355. The
Service indicated that "it can better serve taxpayers by dedicating its resources to increas-
ing the amount of published guidance regarding § 355, including the business purpose re-
quirement, and other legal questions." Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-2 C.B. 86. I thank Joshua
Blank for raising this point. Whether the Service has abided by Revenue Procedure 2003-
48 is not entirely clear.
248 See, e.g., Joe et al., note 80, at 246.
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IRS mindset, CAP presents a real danger of taxpayer misallocation of
IRS resources.
The strongest argument in favor of this reallocation of IRS re-
sources is that service to taxpayers can be an essential means of ensur-
ing their compliance. 249 According to this line of thought, we should
applaud, rather than be concerned about, CAP's provision of service
to taxpayers, because providing service through CAP may be an im-
portant way to ensure an ongoing, normative commitment to tax com-
pliance among large businesses. This belief aligns with responsive tax
administration's emphasis on persuasion as a means of ensuring com-
pliance. Service is a specific form of the broader persuasive effort. As
a result, responsive tax administration, in addition to tax compliance
scholarship outside the responsive tax administration ambit, has em-
phasized service as part of the menu of persuasion available to en-
courage compliance. 250
As an initial matter, however, like the empirical evidence regarding
responsive tax administration more generally, the empirical evidence
regarding service is decidedly mixed. As a result, it is questionable
which, if any, taxpayers are more likely to comply as a result of service
provision in CAP. Despite general support for service as part of the
responsive tax administration agenda, and the broader support for
service in tax compliance literature, little evidence exists to show that
service actually improves compliance in a reliable way. 251 In 1998, the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act reformed
the IRS to emphasize taxpayer rights and customer service. 252 In
2003, Leandra Lederman engaged in an extensive review of the claim
that service increases compliance, in light of the this legislation. 253
Lederman found that "increased service to taxpayers, in an effort to
help them fulfill their compliance obligations, does not seem to affect
249 See, e.g., Hite, note 66, at 250-51, 262; Raskolnikov, note 5, at 713, 706 n.84; Smith,
note 66, at 224-25, 227-29.
250 For example, ATO Commissioner Michael D'Ascenzo emphasized the importance of
service in a speech articulating the application of responsive regulation to Australian tax
administration: "Responsive regulation works a bit like a pyramid: at the bottom are the
bulk of cooperating taxpayers who enjoy a regulatory strategy based on service delivery,
assistance, convenience, access, transparency and accountability." Michael D'Ascenzo,
Comm'r, Austl. Tax'n Office, Luncheon Briefing to the Comm. for Economic Develop-
ment in Australia: Building a Better Australia (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.ato.
gov.au/onlineservices/content.aspx?menuid=39504&doc=/content/00148892.htm&page=1.
251 See, e.g., James Alm, Todd Cherry, Michael Jones & Michael McKee, Taxpayer In-
formation Assistance Services and Tax Compliance Behavior, 31 J. Econ. Psychol. 577, 578
(2010) (noting that the actual effect of a service paradigm on tax compliance has not been
examined systematically).
252 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
253 Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 971
(2003).
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compliance. ' 254 Since Lederman's study, the evidence regarding the
impact of service on compliance has not changed significantly. A re-
cent experiment regarding the impact of service on taxpayer compli-
ance found that a tax agency's provision of information increased tax
compliance. 255 In the experiment, however, the audit rate was both
certain and specified to taxpayers at the time that they made their
reporting decision, 256 meaning that they did not consider the poten-
tially reduced indirect deterrence that may result from service provi-
sion, discussed below.
Importantly, the emphasis on service without consideration of the
impact on deterrence fails, again, to recognize the important balancing
act between persuasion and deterrence. Specifically, the use of signifi-
cant resources in CAP based on taxpayer self-selection poses a danger
to the indirect effect of IRS enforcement, or random auditing, activ-
ity.25 7 Ideally, the Service would have sufficient resources to review
the tax situations of all large business taxpayers. If responsive tax ad-
ministration did, indeed, improve compliance and the Service had un-
limited resources, it should first engage all large business taxpayers
through persuasive measures and follow up if necessary with more en-
forcement-based activity. The significant limitations on the Service's
resources, however, allow it to review the tax situations of only a frac-
tion of all large business taxpayers.2 58 In this world with very limited
resources, offering CAP by open invitation to all large business tax-
payers, including IC taxpayers that otherwise would not be subject to
IRS review, threatens the Service's ability to engage in random audit.
This threat to the Service's random audit capability has important
implications for indirect revenue raising capabilities. This "indirect ef-
fect" of Service activity is the additional tax revenue raised from tax-
payers not directly subject to the Service's efforts, whether they are
enforcement efforts (such as an audit) or service provision. The most
254 Id. at 995-96.
255 Alm et al., note 251, at 583.
256 Id. at 582.
257 In this regard, it is interesting to contrast CAP with programs that are more sensitive
to the self-selection problem. John Braithwaite acknowledges that "[o]ne criticism of
APAs that may have merit is that they divert resources to cooperative corporations and
away from corporations that engage in aggressive tax planning." John Braithwaite, Meta
Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax System Integrity, 25 Law & Pol'y 1,
13 (2003). He contrasts this with the Australian Transfer Pricing Record Review and Im-
provement Project, in which "the most aggressive companies who spurn the APA all get a
transfer pricing audit, a more intensive intervention than the APA. Hence, there is fidelity
to the principle of the compliance model that cooperation must be associated with move-
ment down the enforcement pyramid and combative tax planning with movement up." Id.
258 See, e.g., Miller, note 162 (estimating that the Service has an approximately 11.9%
coverage rate for the "mid-market" large business taxpayers, which are business taxpayers
with assets between $10 million and $250 million).
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extensive research about the indirect effects from IRS efforts comes
from the context of individual taxpayers. This research suggests that
the indirect effect of audits is particularly powerful precisely because
taxpayers cannot exert extensive control over whether or not they will
be audited.
Most notably, Alan Plumley conducted a comprehensive study of
panel data over a ten-year period to determine the indirect behavioral
impact of enforcement and service on taxpayer voluntary compliance
in the context of individuals.259 Plumley found that "audits have a
strong, positive impact on reporting compliance," and that, specifi-
cally, the average indirect effect of audits was 11.6 times the size of the
direct adjustment proposed by audit.260 Plumley found mixed results
with respect to service provision.261 The most important result, for the
purposes of extrapolation to CAP, was the comparable effectiveness
of audits and return preparation efforts. While Plumley found that
assisting taxpayers with return preparation provided a more cost-ef-
fective way to increase indirect revenue than audits, this finding was
attributable to the fact that audits cost $1298 per unit, whereas provid-
ing individual taxpayers with tax return preparation assistance was
very cheap, costing only $13.74 per unit.262 A closer look at the data
reveals that audits resulted in much greater indirect revenue per unit
than assistance in preparation of taxpayer returns. Specifically, audits
yielded thirteen times greater marginal indirect revenue than tax re-
turn preparation assistance. 263 The important takeaway point is that
audits were much, much more costly, but also much, much more effec-
tive, in indirectly increasing voluntary compliance than assisting tax-
payers with tax return preparation.
Audits presumably had such a powerful indirect compliance impact
because, when the number of audits rises, even taxpayers not subject
to audit report more out of greater fear of being audited. To the ex-
259 Alan H. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance: Estimat-
ing the Impacts of Tax Policy, Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness (1996), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/publ9l6b.pdf.
260 Id. at 35.
261 He found that return preparation efforts for taxpayers did have a significant and
positive effect on taxpayer reporting, but that handling taxpayer telephone calls had a
weakly significant negative impact on income reporting. Id. at 37.
262 Id. at 41.
263 This figure was derived by the author from Plumley's data as follows. The marginal
indirect revenue/cost ratio for audits was 54.6. The marginal indirect revenue/cost ratio for
taxpayer-prepared returns was 395.9. The cost per unit for audits was $1298. The cost per
unit for taxpayer prepared returns was $13.74. Id. at 41. The indirect revenue for audits
could therefore be derived from the equation: Indirect Revenue/1298 = 54.6. The solution
was 70,870.8. The indirect revenue for taxpayer prepared returns could be derived from
the equation: Indirect revenue/13.74 = $395.90. The solution was $5,439.67. 70,870.0/
5,439.67 = $13.03.
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tent that provision of service decreases the Service's ability to audit,
this powerful, indirect deterrent effect decreases. In short, the threat
that any taxpayer at any time may be subject to IRS review (which
results from the Service's robust use of random auditing), and not just
the actual attention that the Service provides to taxpayers, may have a
significant compliance impact.
This theoretical point is significant for the large business context.264
More IC taxpayers participating in CAP may serve as a signal to
other, non-CAP, IC taxpayers that they are less likely to receive IRS
review. This is particularly troublesome because CAP requires re-
sources akin to, though not the same as, a traditional audit.265 CAP
therefore may reduce significantly the threat of unwanted examina-
tion, in a manner more problematic than offering some lower amount
of guidance to taxpayers on a case-by-case basis. It appears to do so
without the large, countervailing cost savings accompanying service
provision in other contexts. An ideal world in which the IRS would
be able to offer CAP to all large business taxpayers without overshad-
owing the important role of audit in encouraging compliance does not
exist. As a result, by being available to all large business taxpayers,
CAP once again overemphasizes responsive tax administration's focus
on persuasion, to the detriment of an important deterrence measure,
in this case random audits.
VI. CAP SOLUTIONS AND BROADER LESSONS
In this Article, I examined three problems with CAP: the decreas-
ing accountability as a result of CAP and the resulting need for moni-
toring, the lack of meaningful failure to disclose penalties in CAP and
the resulting test-drive effect, and the self-selection bias problem and
the resulting potential misallocation of resources. This Part suggests
solutions to each problem. Since this Article provides a first critical
look at CAP, these solutions are both novel and preliminary. In line
with the general suggestion that responsive tax administration in the
264 Of course, translating from the individual taxpayer context to the large business con-
text is not ideal. In the large business context, agents are making decisions on behalf of a
large organization. The set of dynamics facing these agents will inherently be somewhat
different than the dynamics facing individuals. Much of the responsive tax administration
research itself is based on studies with individuals. As a result, simply in response, it seems
reasonable to include studies such as Plumley's that also rely on individual taxpayers and
that seem to point in the opposite direction. More generally, to the extent that existing
research (such as Plumley's) raises questions about the direction of the Service's large busi-
ness compliance efforts, we should take this research into account, albeit with the acknowl-
edgment that future research regarding large businesses specifically is needed.
265 See note 238 for discussion of the estimated time for CAP as opposed to traditional
audit and some open questions.
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United States should be subject to more monitoring and critical analy-
sis, these solutions should be viewed as first responses to the problems
identified and should be continually reexamined, depending on how
they are actually working in large business tax compliance. After set-
ting forth proposed solutions to the particular CAP problems, this
Part describes how the CAP analysis points toward a more general
need to get realistic about responsive tax administration in U.S. large
business.
The clear solution to the first problem with CAP, the decreasing
accountability and the need for monitoring, is establishing a system of
evaluation. Developing a workable form of evaluation, however, is
not easy. Moving toward metrics reduces the discretion that can be
central to responsive tax administration. Valerie Braithwaite has also
argued that, with responsive tax administration, metrics can simply
miss the point. She explains: "Trust and respect depend on under-
standing the position of others, recognizing different viewpoints, and
knowing how to respond to them in a way that is accepted as just and
fair. Such understanding does not come from compliance records
"266
Nonetheless, some middle road must be forged between complete
discretion accompanied by complete secrecy, and a process so ham-
pering that it stymies any possibility for successful, cooperative regula-
tion. This middle road can take a number of forms. First, the IRS
should generate and release information that would allow a compari-
son between the relative tax liabilities paid by companies in CAP and
the relative tax liabilities paid by companies not in the program. In
determining how, exactly, the Service should reveal this information, a
natural tension exists between the desire for specificity and the practi-
cal difficulties with revealing useful, specific information. As a gen-
eral matter, the tax information that taxpayers provide to the IRS is
confidential, and the Service is not allowed to reveal it publicly.267
Even revealing the names of taxpayers participating in CAP seem-
ingly runs afoul of this broad confidentiality rule. 268 While a number
266 Braithwaite, note 35, at 49.
267 IRC § 6103.
268 See IRC § 6103(b) (defining the tax information subject to confidentiality very
broadly and including "a taxpayer's identity" within the prohibition). Scholars have fre-
quently noted how § 6103 can, at times, make it difficult for the Service to publicize its
enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance,
51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1065, 1069 (2003) (concluding that "an uncritical focus on taxpayer
confidentiality by Government policy makers has limited the IRS's efforts to create public-
ity campaigns that could result in dramatic improvements in overall levels of income tax
compliance."); Morse, note 147, at 717-18. But see Blank, note 63 (supporting privacy
policy because it allows the government to release tax enforcement information selectively,
thereby affecting taxpayers' perceptions of the Service's enforcement capabilities).
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of CAP taxpayers have publicly revealed their participation in the
program, 69 many have not. Nevertheless, the Service could provide
de-identified data regarding tax liability paid in CAP and outside of
CAP.2 70 In order to make the data useful, the Service would need to
indicate what tax liability was paid, relative to pretax income. While
simply indicating the effective tax rates of companies in CAP and
outside of CAP seems like an easy way to do this, effective tax rates
would not be a particularly useful measure. Even though they are
conveniently publicly available for companies filing public financial
statements, effective tax rates are a financial accounting measure. As
such, they take into account the reserves that a company has on its
financial statements for uncertain tax benefits. As a result, CAP com-
panies may have lower effective tax rates because they have lower
reserves, not because they have actually paid less tax to the govern-
ment.2 71 Based on the final tax liability that a company pays for a
given tax year, however, the Service should be able to provide useful,
though currently not publicly available, information. The Service
could indicate the total pretax income or loss of CAP participants,
even broken down by industry sector and size (on a no-names basis)
along with the total tax liability (or credit) for a given year. This
would provide a very rough means of comparing outcomes for CAP
and non-CAP taxpayers. In order to have some ability to examine the
impact of the program on taxpaying, the Service should provide the
same data for CAP and non-CAP taxpayers in the sample for the
three years prior to the tax year in question.
If the emerging CAP profile appears problematic, the Service
should prepare and release redacted information regarding the nature
of agreements reached in CAP versus the traditional audit process.
The Service releases a plethora of guidance regarding tax decisions it
has reached, including, among other things, revenue rulings, letter rul-
ings, field service advice, notices, and general counsel memoranda.272
Decisions made in CAP should not fall outside the realm of this exten-
269 See notes 12-16.
270 See § 6103(b)(2)(D) (indicating that the IRS may release "data in a form which can-
not be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.").
271 An interesting, new paper drives this point home. Lisa De Simone, John R. Robin-
son, and Bridget Stomberg examined the divergent financial reporting practices of firms,
with respect to an uncertain tax issue. De Simone et al., note 5. Specifically, they detailed
how paper companies treated the exact same tax issue differently for both tax and financial
reporting purposes. Some companies claimed a tax benefit for the purposes of their tax
returns; others did not. Of those that claimed the benefit for the purposes of their tax
returns, some recorded a reserve for financial statement purposes, others did not. The
paper provides insight into how, independent of actual tax return aggressiveness, compa-
nies' financial reporting practices can impact effective tax rates.
272 E.g., Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man's Land of Tax Code Interpre-
tation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 239, 240-41. Indeed, the Freedom of Information Act re-
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sive guidance process. Rather, the Service should provide guidance
from the CAP context to the same extent it provides guidance from
outside of the program. 273 The Service should indicate which gui-
dance is from CAP and which is not, for the purposes of monitoring
the differences, if any.
Finally, if this CAP information raises, rather than allays, concerns
regarding compliance outcomes in the program, the Service should be
open to a dialogue with stakeholders about means of instituting third
party monitoring more closely into the process. While this result is
clearly cumbersome, it should only be reached if the less intrusive
forms of monitoring raise serious questions about the potentially dele-
terious effect of CAP on large business tax administration. Both the
empirical questions about the power of responsive tax administration
and the real danger of capture require such potential oversight, as a
last resort, to ensure that CAP increases taxpayers' voluntary commit-
ment to tax compliance.
The second problem with CAP is the lack of meaningful penalties
for failure-to-disclose violations. As a solution to this problem, the
Service should apply penalties for failure to be transparent in CAP,
thereby appropriately incorporating all aspects of responsive regula-
tion. A failure-to-disclose penalty applied in CAP is not equivalent to
a failure-to-disclose penalty in the context of return filing, because the
latter imposes a significant element of risk. The taxpayer has only one
chance to disclose-at return filing. If the taxpayer does not disclose
on the return as required and the Service finds the issue, then the
taxpayer must pay the failure-to-disclose penalty. On the other hand,
since CAP involves reviewing taxpayers' transactions in real time, it is
not possible to require taxpayers to disclose all issues when CAP re-
view begins. Given this limitation, any penalties applied within CAP
quires the IRS, like other federal agencies, to release a broad array of "records" to the
public. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (2006).
273 Those familiar with the debate over whether to release APAs might question how
CAP agreements can be released without inappropriately revealing private taxpayer infor-
mation. A common argument made against APA release was that APAs rely heavily on
detailed taxpayer factual information, which is inappropriate to release under a combina-
tion of § 6103 and § 6110. Further, since APAs do rely so heavily on the particular facts
and circumstances of a given taxpayer's situation, releasing redacted rulings would not
actually provide meaningful guidance. See, e.g., Hickman, note 74, at 187-88 (discussing
this argument). However, CAP uniquely comprises agreement regarding a whole set of
issues across a taxpayer's entire tax return. As a result, while some agreed-on CAP issues
may very well be difficult to redact in a manner that provides meaningful guidance, many
presumably could be described in a reasonable, redacted fashion. The important point is
that CAP should not be entirely immune from the normal guidance process. To the extent
that guidance can come out of the CAP process, it should. To the extent that it is not
possible to release meaningful guidance while protecting taxpayer confidentiality, the IRS
should release the information it can and explain why it is not releasing more information.
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would still allow taxpayers to leverage information obtained during
the CAP process to determine whether or not to disclose. As a result,
as is the case currently, the traditional failure-to-disclose penalties
should apply whether a taxpayer used CAP or not. If a taxpayer used
CAP, these failure-to-disclose penalties should be multiplier penalties.
In other words, if a CAP taxpayer does not disclose an issue on its tax
return as was required by the disclosure rules, the taxpayer should
have to pay a penalty that is a multiple of the ordinary penalty. This
multiplier penalty should be designed to counteract the reduced risk
that results from the test-drive effect inherent in CAP.
The intuition behind multiplier penalties comes from deterrence
theory dating back at least to Jeremy Bentham.274 In modern eco-
nomics, Gary Becker most prominently explored how the probability
of detection impacts deterrence and proposed increasing the size of
penalties to offset the probability of an actor avoiding detection.275 In
the tax context, scholars have examined a so-called "Bentham-
Becker" penalty, under which the optimal penalty for tax noncompli-
ance is the amount of tax underpaid divided by the probability of de-
tection. 276 Under this model, taxpayers pay higher penalties when the
likelihood of nondetection of their noncompliance increases. 277 As
applied to CAP, multiplier failure-to-disclose penalties for CAP tax-
payers ideally should offset the manner in which the test-drive effect
otherwise reduces the penalties' potency.
Scholars have pointed out various potential problems with Ben-
tham-Becker penalties.278 The principal problems are: the ex post un-
274 Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation 325-26 (R. Hildreth trans., London, Trtibner
& Co. 1864).
275 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ.
169, 193-98 (1968). Multiplier penalties subsequently received extensive attention in the
law and economics literature. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Econom-
ics 446-52 (1988) (modeling optimal combinations of severity and certainty of punishment);
A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 77-78 (2d ed. 1989); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 869, 887-96 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 7.1, at 241 (5th
ed. 1998).
276 See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is
Uncertain, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 241, 266-71 (2007).
277 Id. at 267.
278 Scholars have raised issued with multiplier penalties outside the tax context. Richard
Craswell has examined how the multiplier principle may be sufficient, but not necessary,
when the likelihood of punishment (following detection) varies relative to the egregious-
ness of the offense. Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle
and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2220-23 (1999). This analysis depends funda-
mentally on the assumption that an actor's behavior creates social harm, which can be
reduced via various precautions. As a result, the analysis does not translate easily to the
straightforward tax reporting context, in which the underlying payment is not for social
harm (which can be reduced through precautions) but rather for a taxpayer's tax reporting
obligations (which, ideally, should not be reduceable through precautions).
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fairness of imposing very large penalties on only a limited number of
taxpayers, underdeterrence of taxpayers to the extent that they do not
have enough assets to pay large multiplier penalties, overdeterrence
to the extent that taxpayers are risk-averse, and the difficult problem
of determining what the likelihood of detection is and therefore how
big the multiplier penalty should be.279
These theoretical difficulties should not derail the proposed solu-
tion of multiplier failure-to-disclose penalties in CAP. As an initial
matter, it is important to recognize that the traditional failure-to-dis-
close penalties are quite low, relative both to large business taxpayers'
total assets and the amount of tax potentially saved from engaging in
aggressive tax shelter transactions subject to the disclosure rules. For
example, failure to report a listed transaction results in arguably the
harshest failure-to-disclose penalty, and yet the penalty amount can-
not exceed $200,000.280 On the other hand, large business taxpayers,
by definition, have assets greater than $10 million.281 Tax shelters sub-
ject to the disclosure rules can save taxpayers vast amounts in taxes,
for example by producing tax losses in excess of half a billion dol-
lars.282 These dynamics make some of the theoretical objections to
tax multiplier penalties relatively insignificant, when thinking about
multiplier failure-to-disclose penalties for CAP participants. Even
with very large multipliers, CAP taxpayers are very likely to have
enough assets to pay the multiplier penalties. Additionally, given how
low the traditional failure-to-disclose penalties are relative to the po-
tential tax savings from tax shelters, CAP taxpayers are also unlikely
to be overdeterred significantly as a result of risk-aversity, even with
large multiplier penalties.283 Finally, while there may be some unfair-
ness in imposing large multiplier penalties on only the few CAP tax-
payers whose undisclosed transactions are actually detected, this
unfairness seems less problematic in light of the fact that the failure-
to-disclose penalties themselves (and even multiples of them) are
quite low relative to the potential tax savings from tax shelters.
The most difficult issue with establishing multiplier failure-to-dis-
close penalties is the administrative problem of determining how
much the test-drive effect reduces a CAP taxpayer's likelihood of de-
tection on transactions subject to the disclosure rules and, therefore,
279 Logue, note 268, at 268-71, 277-78.
280 IRC § 6707A(b)(2)(A).
281 IRS Large Bus. and Int'l Tax Ctr., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Large-Business-and-
International-Tax-Center (last updated Sept. 10, 2012).
282 Osofsky, note 137, at 515.
283 Despite the relatively low penalty rate, compared to the large potential gain from not
complying, taxpayers may nonetheless comply for a variety of noneconomic reasons. Id. at
522-23.
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what the multiple should be for such a penalty in CAP. In order for
the multiplier penalty to counteract exactly the value to taxpayers of
the test-drive effect, the multiple would have to take into account the
offsetting factors of decreased likelihood of the failure-to-disclose
penalties as a result of CAP and the extent to which CAP increased
the likelihood of general audit. Neither of these factors can be deter-
mined definitively in any given case, much less in the aggregate.
These issues likely will not be determinative, though, because political
taste for large tax penalties has historically been very low.284 As a
result, the multiple necessary to counteract the value to taxpayers of
the test-drive effect is very likely to be greater than the politically fea-
sible option. The multiple therefore should be as high as politically
feasible, which is mindful of responsive regulation's teaching that the
higher the punitive peak of the pyramid, the more likely that regu-
latees will comply voluntarily at the base. Absorbing this lesson in
CAP is particularly important, because the current lack of punitive-
ness not only threatens to undermine transparency in CAP specifi-
cally, but also threatens to erode the broader, systemwide potency of
the disclosure rules, by essentially providing a means to avoid them.
The solution to the self-selection bias problem is the most straight-
forward. If CAP really does reduce audit cycle time without decreas-
ing compliance, then it should be available to all CIC taxpayers.
These taxpayers otherwise undergo continuous audit, and no down-
side exists in allowing them to elect into the program. The resources
can be downstreamed to IC taxpayers. CAP, however, should not be
available openly by application to IC taxpayers. Unless and until
CAP costs only a very small fraction of the amount of traditional au-
dits, allowing IC taxpayers to self-select into the program poses too
great a danger to the indirect effect of audits on voluntary compliance.
The Service should retain its traditional control over which IC taxpay-
ers get IRS review through its own audit selection process.
To be sure, taxpayers may respond to these proposed solutions in
both anticipated and unanticipated ways. In other words, we should
not assume that the analysis will be static. It is impossible to imagine
every possible change in taxpayers' behavior in response to these pro-
posed solutions. Some responses, though, can be more easily antici-
pated. For example, some might argue that providing taxpayers with
additional guidance regarding CAP decisions would increase taxpay-
ers' abilities to tax plan and decrease their desire to participate in the
program. Rather than participating in CAP to get a favorable deci-
sion regarding a particular transaction, the taxpayer could wait until
284 See, e.g., Logue, note 276, at 291-92 (discussing political difficulties in obtaining very
high tax penalties).
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favorable guidance is issued from CAP and then try to rely on the
decision as precedent during an audit. While certainly a common con-
cern with respect to IRS guidance more generally, 285 ultimately it
should not forestall the release of greater guidance from CAP. While
it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the potential issues
with secret guidance to large business taxpayers, it is enough to note
that there are equity considerations weighing in favor of the public
release of favorable guidance that otherwise may be available only to
well-connected CAP taxpayers. Moreover, to the extent that inappro-
priately favorable guidance is being provided in CAP under the veil of
privacy, requiring its release may be an important check on the Ser-
vice's willingness to concede in secret under the influence of reciproc-
ity. As another example, the enactment of multiplier penalties would
reduce the perceived benefit to taxpayers of entering into CAP, as
compared to the current system. Some might argue that increasing
the size of penalties in CAP might crowd out taxpayers' voluntary
compliance incentives in the program. 286 Indeed, imposing penalties
always creates this risk. While penalties pose the danger of crowding
out voluntary compliance incentives, the absence of penalties creates
its own set of problems, including potentially discouraging taxpayers
from complying for fear of being the only "chumps"287 voluntarily
paying taxes. Even though imposing penalties carries risks, a hard
look at the program reveals that CAP needs more punitiveness. Al-
though only time and experimentation will reveal all the unanticipated
consequences of the proposed solutions, the lack of complete informa-
tion should not prevent adopting solutions that appear to be the best
course of action, given the existing information. Additionally, greater
monitoring of CAP generally, as proposed, should allow continued
evaluation of and response to the intended and unintended impacts of
these solutions.
Stepping outside the particular CAP problems analyzed and solu-
tions proposed, this Article is a first step in a broader critique of the
responsive tax administration model in the U.S. large business tax
sphere. To some extent, each responsive tax administration program
must be evaluated based on its own, particular application in a given
285 See Amy S. Elliott, Roundtable Panelists Lament Tax Guidance Process (July 25,
2011), 2011 TNT 142-1, Aug. 1, 2011, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (in which
practitioners and the IRS discuss the Service's fear of releasing incorrect guidance that
taxpayers might be able to take advantage of).
286 For a classic example of penalties crowding out intrinsic compliance motivation, see
Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1, 3 (2000) (describing
how imposition of fines for late pickups at daycare increased late pickups).
287 See, e.g., Blank, note 146, at 542, 580 (discussing how taxpayers may fail to pay taxes
if they believe others are not, in order to avoid feeling like "chumps").
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
TAX LAW REVIEW
tax compliance setting.2 88 Responsive regulation, after all, holds as a
central tenet the idea of responsiveness. At base, compliance pro-
grams should be judged based on whether they work in particular
situations.
Nevertheless, the analysis of CAP in this Article provides certain
lessons that can be generalized as part of a continuing examination of
responsive tax administration in U.S. large business tax compliance.
The first lesson is that responsive tax administration, while offering
theoretical promise, suffers from potential, underappreciated weak-
nesses. In an ideal world, responsive tax administration would be able
to turn tax-minimizing, game-playing taxpayers into partners engaging
in a productive conversation with the government about their tax obli-
gations. At present, this vision is simply an ideal. Taxpayers engaging
in any number of programs linked with responsive tax administration,
including CAP, the Fast Track Settlement Program, Limited Issue Fo-
cus Examinations, the Pre-Filing Agreement Program, and the Indus-
try Issue Resolution Program, have not been shown to be less likely to
be engaging in tax-reducing games than other taxpayers. The Service
has not produced evidence regarding these programs that provides
cause for faith in the integrity of their tax compliance outcomes. The
empirical evidence regarding Responsive Tax Administration, gener-
ally, in some ways raises additional concerns. As a result, we should
be wary of support for compliance programs merely because scholars
have linked such programs to a responsive tax administration regime.
Along the same lines, we should be wary of claims by government
officials that we have reached a new day in large business tax compli-
ance, simply because companies are utilizing programs emphasizing
cooperation between taxpayers and tax administrators. While the lack
of convincing empirical evidence is not an inherent failing of respon-
sive tax administration, it does counsel against accepting its predic-
tions, without considering alternative, potential impacts that
responsive tax administration may have on taxpayer compliance. As
the United States continues to develop large business tax compliance
programs based in these ideas of cooperative tax regulation, then, it
should continually assess the actual impact of responsive tax adminis-
tration on compliance.2 89
288 See Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in Taxing Democracy,
note 7, at 8 (noting that responsive regulation is not a "cookbook[ ]" that can be applied in
the same manner in all situations).
289 See Lobel, note 27, at 450 ("As is often the case in a paradigm transformation, sup-
porters of the nascent vision invest great efforts to demonstrate its potential and strengths,
often by imagining the best possible scenarios for the adoption of the new framework.
However, ideal theories are never risk free. Particularly in the rich setting of governance,
with its affluence in meanings, there is also a need to warn against certain blind spots and
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The second lesson is that, even putting aside some of the theoretical
difficulties with responsive tax administration, incomplete implemen-
tation can exacerbate existing weaknesses. Namely, the implementa-
tion of largely persuasive aspects of the program without punitive
backing may threaten both the integrity of responsive tax administra-
tion programs and the broader large business tax compliance system.
This implementation failing may result because a program, like CAP,
may gain scholarly support as part of a responsive tax administration
framework, without sufficient attention in the regulator community to
the entirety (or even the existence, as the case may be) of the theory
that influenced the program's creation. The responsive tax adminis-
tration architects themselves recognized that responsive tax adminis-
tration does not work absent important punitive elements. Given the
real institutional constraints facing regulators, however, these punitive
elements may fall by the wayside. Even if, in an ideal world, the IRS
could offer ample amounts of persuasive service to all taxpayers with-
out undermining deterrence capabilities, given the reality of resource
constraints, a tradeoff exists between the two. Focusing extensively
on service therefore poses a threat to the deterrence features that play
an important role in the large business tax compliance system.
A number of lessons can be drawn from these implementation diffi-
culties. Even to the extent that we can get comfortable with respon-
sive tax administration's emphasis on persuasion to elicit cooperation
from taxpayers (for example, by instituting monitoring and checks to
assure that persuasiveness does not give way to inappropriate regula-
tor concessions), we must ensure that, in implementing the program,
persuasion remains backed by significant punitive and deterrence-
based elements. To the extent that tax administrators do not have
sufficient resources to foreground persuasion while maintaining strong
punitive and deterrence-based elements, we should strongly consider
curtailing the persuasive program. Under such circumstances, respon-
sive tax administration should be implemented creatively, for exam-
ple, only in sectors in which the IRS has the resources to put the
entirety of the program in place. The CIC taxpayer sector is likely
sucha place. The entire large business tax base likely is not. Particu-
lar, targeted compliance projects may present other possibilities for
complete application of the program. Alternatively, combining risk
difficulties."); see also Braithwaite, note 39, at 229 (acknowledging the importance of de-
veloping hard empirical evidence and indicating that "[i]t will take many years of hard
empirical work before we know whether restorative and responsive tax administration can
actually increase the integrity of tax systems.").
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management with responsive tax administration may offer a more rea-
sonable and fruitful path forward. 290
At bottom, we must get beyond the promise of responsive tax ad-
ministration and give a good, hard look into whether responsive tax
administration is working as promised in United States large business.
290 See text accompanying notes 59-60. At this point, although I do not necessarily en-
dorse this possibility, the practice is worth additional examination.
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